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ABSTRACT 
 
Healthcare costs in the United States continue to grow at an 
alarming rate. Concerning the cost of medications, there are a number 
of factors that drive these costs.  While personnel costs are not the 
largest of these, they do contribute a significant portion.  The cost of 
the cognitive component of order processing by pharmacists can range 
from three dollars to over six dollars per prescription depending on the 
production throughput of the pharmacist. 
Studies at the organization which was the focus of the research, 
as well as reports in the literature, indicated that work disruption and 
other environmental factors could impact the rate at which pharmacist 
process physicians’ orders into prescriptions.   At the time of this study 
the collaborating facility was undergoing a re-organization; funding 
had been allocated to relocate and redesign the outpatient pharmacy.  
This provided a timely opportunity to examine the effect that changes 
to the physical plant, with specific attention being given to reducing 
interruptions to the pharmacists finishing orders, would have on 
pharmacists’ productivity. This was measured in orders processed per 
hour, before and after the reorganization. 
 vi 
Sixteen months after the pharmacy was moved, supervisors 
were concerned that the outpatient pharmacy was still not performing 
at maximum efficiency and workload data was posted, with the intent 
that this information would motivate those professionals, whose output 
may have been below the average, to increase their production. 
All outpatient prescriptions are maintained in a data base which 
records, among other items, the pharmacist who processed the order 
which generated the prescription and the time and date this was done.  
Data for prescriptions filled before and after each intervention were 
abstracted from the data base and used to determine production rates 
before and after the interventions. 
There was a small, but statistically significant, decrease of two 
prescriptions per hour per pharmacist in production following the 
relocation.  Fourteen of the twenty-one pharmacists (66.6%) had 
decreases in productivity averaging 4.1 prescriptions per hour while 
seven had an increase averaging 2.2 prescriptions per hour.   All but 
one of the pharmacists who had an increase in productivity after the 
relocation also had a slight, but statistically insignificant, increase 
averaging 3.0 prescriptions per hour per pharmacist after the posting 
of the workload data. 
The effect of posting the workload data was not statistically 
significant even though the study group processed 16,692 more orders 
 vii 
working only 221 more hours.  Nine of the study pharmacists (42.8%) 
had decreases in productivity averaging 2.3 prescriptions per hour per 
person, while the remaining twelve increased production by an 
average of 2.8 prescriptions per hour per pharmacist.  
An analysis of both effects, using ANOVA, indicated that the 
pharmacist was a significant contributor to the effect in both cases.  
Only in the analysis of the impact of the relocation was the effect of 
the intervention significant and that was to decrease productivity. 
The net result of this research was that the postulated 
interventions to increase productivity had no real effect and the 
motivation of the pharmacists may be the most significant factor.  The 
fact that a third of the study pharmacists had decreases in productivity 
after both interventions is telling and may indicate problems with job 
design and motivation. 
A further review of production rates and error are indicated with 
an emphasis on determining if there is an association between error 
rate and production rate.  At this point there are little published data 
and what is available is either conjecture, as in the case of the North 
Carolina Board’s determination of 150 prescriptions per day being a 
safe upper limit, to Malone’s survey based research determining an 
average rate of 14.1 prescriptions per hour. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Background 
 There are many reasons for work redesign, two of which are 
safety and increased productivity, with a resultant decrease in cost.  
These two factors are related.  It is an unfortunate fact of life that, at 
least with the court system in the United States, simply focusing on 
productivity, without considering possible unintended consequences, 
such as increased errors, can lead to litigation with resultant costs that 
far exceed savings from increased productivity.   
The system used to process outpatient prescriptions was 
reviewed (Figure 1.1) and it was noted that there was a significant 
bottle neck in the processing of prescribers’ orders by the pharmacist.  
With few exceptions, refill requests are handled by the mail system 
with no intervention by a pharmacist.  Once prescriptions are in the 
mail queue, a major portion of the processing (90%) is handled by 
robotics, either at CMOP or by the ScriptPro® dispensing robot.   
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Figure 1.1 Out-Patient Processing Flow Chart 
 
Discussing throughput for the cognitive processing of physicians' 
orders into prescriptions begs the question as to how many orders per 
hour can a pharmacist safely process.  One prescription every five 
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minutes, every minute, every thirty seconds?  At this time, there are 
no clear answers to this particular question but further research into 
this aspect of pharmacy is definitely warranted. 
This research examines the effect of pharmacy work design 
strictly from the viewpoint of physician order processing.  Error rate is 
examined but only in the most global of terms.  While the data exist 
for a more detailed analysis, it is beyond the scope of this particular 
project but definitely warrants further investigation.  Toward that end, 
a proposal for gathering this kind of data has already been submitted 
for the necessary approvals.  The data generated from this research 
can be integrated with the detailed error data to determine if there is 
any correlation between cognitive throughput and error rate. 
Purpose of this Research 
This research is an outgrowth of earlier work by the author on 
the impact of internal disruptions on pharmacist production.  There 
was evidence of numerous interruptions to workflow but little research 
as to what impact these interruptions had on the pharmacists’ 
productivity.  The relocation of the outpatient pharmacy provided an 
opportunity to do such research. 
In addition to the impact on production there were concerns 
about the effect of these interruptions on the pharmacists’ attention to 
detail as they were processing prescribers’ orders into prescriptions.  
 4 
The facility’s data base includes records of all order alerts which are 
provided to prescribers and pharmacists and can be mined for any 
correlations between rate of order processing and responses to order 
checks. 
Unfortunately there was not sufficient time to get the necessary 
approvals to use the complete dataset, but there was sufficient 
information to evaluate pharmacist productivity.  This provides 
background data for further research into the area of rate and 
attention to detail, using the response to order alerts as an indicator to 
evaluate individuals not paying attention to these alerts. 
 
Cost Factors and Significant Impact 
 One of the primary reasons for examining work design is quite 
simple; cost. This is especially true of healthcare, in particular 
Figure 1.2  Percent US GDP Spent on Health (HHS) 
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healthcare in the United States (US). In 2009, healthcare costs in the 
US amounted to over 17% of the country's Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP).1  As can be seen in Figure 1.2, the percent of US GDP spent on 
healthcare has been rising steady and shows no sign of decreasing.  If 
the current trend continues, there are data indicating that healthcare 
costs may constitute 29% of GDP by 2030 and 48% by 2050.2  Clearly 
this growth cannot be sustained.  Attempts to rein in these 
expenditures over the last 50 years have not been effective.  With the 
notable exception of France, Germany and Denmark, healthcare 
expenditures for European countries is usually less than 10% of GDP.  
Even those countries with a higher cost of healthcare spend under 
11% of their GDP compared to over 17% spent in the US.3  Figure 1.3 
compares the percent of GDP for several countries whose healthcare 
costs are tracked by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) with that of the United States.  
The reasons for these differences in cost are well beyond the 
scope of this research.  However, it is known that there are significant 
differences between how prescriptions are processed in the European 
Union and the United States.  
  Unfortunately the higher cost of healthcare in the US does not 
necessarily equate to better or higher quality care. The World Health 
Organization's (WHO) report on health systems for its 191 member 
 6 
nations, ranked the US 37th in the quality of healthcare.4  There is 
criticism of the WHO report, based primarily on the difficulty 
comparing diverse health systems. Leaving their ranking system aside, 
there are some parameters, such as infant mortality and life 
expectancy that are easily comparable.  In these areas the US 
continues to rank low at forty-eighth5 and thirty-sixth6 respectively.  
A significant contributor to healthcare costs is related to 
personnel costs.  Since this research is focusing primarily on pharmacy 
services, specifically on pharmacist productivity, attention has been 
placed on the contribution of pharmacist's costs to the processing of a 
prescription.  The median salary for a pharmacist in the United States 
is $113,006.  Pharmacists in the Tampa Bay area make $106,113 
which is slightly less than the national median.7  The salary of the 
Figure 1.3 Comparison Health Costs (OECD Data) 
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pharmacists at the study facility were indexed to the national median 
and are currently slightly above the local, Tampa Bar area median. 
Benefits in the federal system add another 28% to the personnel 
costs.  This amounts to an average hourly cost of $65.30 to provide 
the services of a pharmacist.  The amount of work a pharmacist can 
produce an hour then becomes very relevant.  Any improvement in 
this throughput can result in savings to the organization.   Table 1.1 
displays the cost of finishing a prescription, pharmacist cost only, for 
different production rates.   
Table 1.1 Rx Production Costs per Rx ($) 
10 6.53 
12 5.44 
14 4.66 
16 4.08 
18 3.63 
20 3.27 
 
Increasing productivity from twelve to fourteen prescriptions per 
hour would save approximately 78 cents per prescription. This does 
not seem significant but one has to consider the volume of orders 
processed each year.   The pharmacists at the study facility finish close 
to 650,000 prescriptions per year.  Increasing productivity from twelve 
to fourteen prescriptions per hour could result in a potential savings of 
over $500,000 per year; equivalent to the salary and benefits of nearly 
four pharmacists. 
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Even though process improvements may reduce the need for 
staff, very rarely is there a reduction in force in state or federal 
agencies.  The outpatient pharmacy always has pending prescriptions, 
usually between one and three thousand.  In the case of severe 
backlogs, over-time for staff from other areas of the pharmacy is used 
to supplement the outpatient workforce. Increasing productivity would 
reduce the need for this supplementation and need for over-time; the 
potential savings could easily be realized by the reduction in over-time 
dollars. 
Healthcare Safety 
In 1999 the Institute of Medicine (IOM) released “To err is 
Human”, a report on the safety of healthcare systems in the United 
States.8  They discovered that health system failures accounted for 
anywhere from 44,000 to 98,000 patient deaths each year.  The wide 
rage in the estimate indicated another problem with health systems; 
reporting of errors was not standardized and highly variable.  Despite 
an increasing focus on quality improvement, healthcare organizations 
tend to significantly under report medical errors. 9,10 
The deaths estimated in the IOM report were attributed directly 
to system failures and were not secondary to patients’ underlying 
pathology; they probably would not have occurred if the system had 
functioned properly.  Such mistakes include errors in administering 
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treatment or failure to act on results of monitoring or testing.11   An 
example of such a system failure would be an accidental over dose, in 
which case, the patient receives the correct drug, but at a dosage that 
is potentially harmful.   
A classic example of a drug over dose made national headlines 
when Betsy Lehman, a reporter for the Boston Globe, died after 
receiving four times the dose of Cytoxan indicated for her body 
mass.12 The tragedy in this story is that the dose was questioned by  
pharmacists, but due to confusion in the way the drug protocol was 
written, no substantial action was taken and the patient continued to 
receive the lethal dose.13 
Medication errors are significant factors in healthcare system 
failures.  It is postulated that medication errors account for over 7,000 
deaths annually and injure an additional 1.3 million.14,15  The costs 
associated with the morbidity and mortality of preventable medication 
errors in hospitals was estimated to be over $3.5 billion in 2006 
dollars, with estimates of another $887 million for the ambulatory 
(retail) setting.16 There is some reason to believe that medication 
errors, like other medical mistakes, are poorly documented, so this 
figure is purely an estimate.  These estimates do not include factors 
such as lost earnings and/or time. 
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Studies of medication errors in retail pharmacy have estimated 
that one clinically significant medication error occurs anywhere from    
one to fifty times per thousand prescriptions.17,18  This wide variance in 
the estimate reinforces the fact that error reporting is highly 
problematic.  
A retail pharmacist fills and/or checks anywhere from 130 to 350 
prescriptions per working day. Using the estimates above, this could 
result in a range of one to over 16 errors per retail pharmacist per 
day.  In most cases the patient will not detect even a clinically 
significant error.  Due to the high therapeutic to toxicity ratio of most 
modern medications, many patients can take a short course of therapy 
with the wrong agent and not have significant adverse effects.  For 
example, a patient who receives an oral drug to lower blood sugar 
rather than a lipid lowering agent which was prescribed, would most 
likely only experience some fatigue due to abnormally low blood sugar.  
A normal patient would probably not go into hypoglycemic shock with 
normal doses of the modern drugs to treat diabetes.   
The key word in this supposition is “normal”. There is a potential 
for this kind of error to cause significant morbidity or even mortality in 
patients who are not “normal”, e.g., those who are either very young 
or elderly or who have underlying pathophysiology that would make 
them more sensitive to the effects of the medication.  In these 
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patients even a few doses of the wrong medication could result in 
serious consequences. 
In 2005 a review of the status of health systems in the US 
indicated that progress towards improving patient safety has been 
“frustratingly slow".19  In December of 2010, the Inspector General 
(IG) for the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) 
released a study of healthcare related incidents for Medicare 
beneficiaries.20  The results of this study indicate that in the decade 
since the release of the IOM report, healthcare systems in the United 
States have not done much to improve patient safety.  There have 
been no significant improvements in medication error rates despite the 
best efforts of organizations such as the Institute for Safe Medication 
Practices (ISMP) or the Joint Commission on Accreditation for 
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO).  
The United States Pharmacopeia (USP) was maintaining a 
system for reporting medication errors, MEDMARX.  They have data 
indicating that the incident rate for harmful medication errors 
decreased from 1.67% in 2002 to 1.25% in 2006.21  While a rate of 
even one harmful event for every 100 orders processed may sound 
low, in a high volume operation that would equate to over two to three 
harmful events per working day.  While the USP maintained the 
dataset the information was free to any users.   However in 2008, 
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Quantros Inc acquired MEDMARX from the USP and now requires a 
subscription to access the data.22 
Healthcare systems are complex; there is no single factor that 
can be identified as a root cause of an organization’s failure to improve 
patient safety.  Organizational culture and fear of litigation tend to 
make healthcare professionals reluctant to report errors.  Significant 
under-reporting makes it difficult to identify and ameliorate underlying 
sources of error.  While reporting has improved in the last decade, 
some members of the legal profession have exacerbated the fear of 
litigation.  Attorneys have used the IOM data to encourage individuals 
to file lawsuits; “A mere 13 percent of patients who are seriously 
injured due to medical negligence ever file a Medical Malpractice 
lawsuit.” proclaims one web site offering to provide relief for patient 
who have been injured due to medical mistakes.23 The release of the 
2010 Inspector General’s report on error allowed the attorneys to 
update their advertisements. 
The increasing role of medication errors in harm has also 
increased litigation in this area.  As the practice of pharmacy moved 
from the independently owned pharmacy to the chain drugstores the 
attorneys focused on the “deep pockets” of the chain stores and the 
incidence of suits involving dispensing errors is on the rise.   
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One example of such a suit involved a patient who was given 
Warfarin rather than Lomotil; an anticoagulant was given in place of 
an antidiarrheal. While this is a pure dispensing error the suit 
specifically alleged pharmacy malpractice; “...claiming that the 
pharmacy failed to read the prescription correctly, misfilled his 
medication bottle with incorrect drugs, and failed to properly analyze 
Stevens’ medication profile, which could have prevented the 
medication mistake.”24  In this case the plaintiffs are asking for 
$200,000.  There is no argument that the patient was harmed, he 
experienced bleeding and did require emergency treatment.  There is 
no indication if the pharmacist who made the error had their 
employment with CVS terminated.   
The role of organizational culture in the reporting, or lack of 
reporting, of errors is also a significant factor in the under reporting of 
such events.  Healthcare practitioners are subjected to a peer review 
process as part of their performance.  Errors are considered part of 
this review and a “higher than normal” error rate can subject the 
healthcare worker to disciplinary action.  For significant deviation from 
the norm, this can result in termination of employment.   The problem 
is in the definition of “normal”; if an event is under reported, the 
normal value is lower than it ought to be.  In other words, most 
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professionals, if they reported any error, could easily find themselves 
outside the “norm”.   
Any errors reported to Regulatory Boards are part of the public 
record and can have a negative effect on the practitioner’s professional 
reputation as well as a potential impact on their livelihood.  While 
license revocations are rare, even a short suspension will have an 
impact on the pharmacist's income.  As a result, there is a clear 
disincentive to report one’s own errors and social pressures not to 
report those of a colleague.    
Another reason not to report or admit to such errors is the case 
of Eric Cropp, a pharmacist who lost his license and was convicted of 
involuntary manslaughter for a medication error that resulted in the 
death of a young girl.  This person lost his ability to earn a living and is 
now a convicted felon due to what was a tragic dispensing error.  This 
is the first case where a dispensing error was criminalized.25 
Publications by Evans and Pihl have increased this reluctance to 
report, especially among pharmacists. These researchers believe that 
a leading cause of dispensing errors by pharmacists is a deficit in 
pharmacists’ short-term memory.    They state: 
…you can rework systems to reduce the likelihood of error, 
but there are people who tend toward making errors, 
people who will find a way to make an error even if they fill 
just one script a day. There are people who cannot 
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multitask and should not be working in an environment 
like a chain drugstore.26   
 
Their research indicated that 12% of pharmacy practitioners had 
deficits in working memory that could predispose them to making a 
dispensing error.   It seems reasonable to assume that pharmacists 
would be reluctant to self-report errors that might categorize them as 
someone who “…should not be working in an environment like a chain 
drug store”. This would be especially true if that was the environment 
in which the pharmacist was working.  This would be tantamount to 
the pharmacist admitting that he or she was incapable of performing 
their job. 
In many states, consumers are encouraged to report errors 
committed by any medical professional.  For example, the State Board 
of Pharmacy for the state of Florida has a web site where consumers 
can easily report errors.  The required forms can be found on the 
home page of the Florida Department of Health, division of Medical 
Quality Assurance.27 The penalty for having a pharmacy error reported 
to the Florida Board of Pharmacy often involves a mandatory eight 
hour Continuing Education Requirement that involves Evans’s training 
on multi-tasking.  Evans and Pihl have set up a corporation, ForeFront 
Logic that charges $285 for this program required by the State Board 
of Pharmacy.28  This requirement is based on an appearance before 
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the Florida Board of Pharmacy by Evans and Pihl wherein they 
presented their theories that it was the inability of the pharmacist to 
multi-task that was a significant contributing factor to dispensing 
errors.  To date, there have been no hard data indicating that this is 
actually reducing dispensing errors.   
There are other factors, such as age, stress and fatigue that 
affect the ability to multitask.  Due to staffing cutbacks, healthcare 
professions tend to work long shifts, often 10 to 12 hours.  There are 
few if any breaks taken during these shifts and pharmacists are more 
likely to cite their “frenetic workplace” as a source of error rather than 
simply an inability to multitask.  Pharmacists have filed lawsuits citing 
such conditions as a defense in cases where they have been found to 
have made dispensing errors. 29  
 The Board of Pharmacy’s position is that the individual 
pharmacist is ultimately responsible for insuring that he/she is capable 
of practicing in a professional manner. The rule specifically state that 
the following would be ground for disciplinary action by the board: 
“Being unable to practice with reasonable skill and safety 
to patients by reason of illness or use of alcohol, drugs, 
narcotics, chemicals, or any other type of material or as a 
result of any mental or physical condition.”30 
 
 This would mean that pharmacists are responsible for insuring 
that they do not work more hours per day than they can physically 
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tolerate, that they not go without breaks or meals if such are needed 
for them to maintain adequate mental functioning and they do not try 
to process more prescriptions per hour than they think they can fill 
with a reasonable margin for safety.  If the pharmacist attempts to use 
workload, long hours, work conditions or lack of meals as contributing 
to an error, they are, in essence, indicating that they have worked 
while impaired and should not have been practicing pharmacy at that 
point in time; that person is solely responsible for any errors that 
occurred. 
The board has not established rules regulating the amount of 
time a professional can spend on duty and be reasonably expected to 
work safely.  Rules such as these are used in the aviation and 
transportation industry and are rigidly enforced by review of logbooks.  
When asked to work inordinately long hours, or work without a break, 
the pharmacist cannot cite work rules that prohibit such actions and is 
under tremendous pressure to comply with the request.  In the state 
of Florida there is no longer a shortage of pharmacists; the number of 
pharmacists and available jobs are relatively balanced.  However there 
are indications that the job market for pharmacists may be getting 
worse, with a possible surplus projected in the next few years.31  
Florida is also an employment at will state and an employer can 
terminate an employee without having to provide cause. As a result, 
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refusal to work a particular schedule or insist on a lunch break could 
result in loss of employment. 
As efforts are made to increase productivity, some consideration 
must be given as to what is a safe number of orders per hour or day 
that a pharmacist can process.  In the case of this research the only 
workload being evaluated is the processing of a physician's order into 
a prescription.   The typical “new” prescription has 15 fields that must 
be reviewed or entered by the pharmacist.  In addition to these fields 
the pharmacist may be presented with one or more alerts that relate 
to possible drug interactions, duplicate drug therapy or possible 
allergic reactions of the patient to the drug.  In addition to a review of 
these alerts, the pharmacist is expected to review any potential issues 
with the drug and known problems the patient's underlying pathology, 
for example a patient with known hypokalemia being given a loop 
diuretic.    
The prompts and response to alerts will be discussed in more 
detail in chapter Three.  It is emphasized here to highlight the concept 
of optimal productivity.  There is a point where the pharmacist may be 
able to process more prescriptions per hour but can only do so by 
sacrificing some of the cognitive duties required to safely finish the 
prescription. 
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Work Design Issues 
If asked about work design, most pharmacy managers would 
describe the physical layout of the pharmacy and the workflow used to 
fill prescriptions.  Few would discuss work environment and job 
characteristics; fewer still would be concerned with the social 
characteristics of the environment.  This almost universal unfamiliarity 
with the current theories of work design by pharmacy managers can 
be a detriment to the operation of the pharmacy.  This is especially 
true in light of the increasing workloads and work hours being 
experienced by today’s pharmacists. 
There are a number of practice environments for pharmacists 
and each has characteristics that are unique for that practice.  The 
work of a retail/outpatient pharmacist differs significantly from that of 
a hospital/in-patient pharmacist both of which differ from the work of a 
pharmacist with a specialty in nuclear pharmacy.   
The focus of this work is on the outpatient sector and all 
references to pharmacy and pharmacist, unless explicitly stated 
otherwise, refer to that particular sector.   There are some slight 
differences between the work of a true retail pharmacist, e.g. a 
pharmacist working at a major chain drug store such as Walgreens or 
CVS and an outpatient pharmacist dispensing medications to 
outpatients in a pharmacy attached to a major hospital.  However 
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these differences are relatively slight and would not be a major factor 
in work design issues. Please note the term outpatient and retail 
pharmacists will be used interchangeably.   
The role and work environment of the pharmacist has changed 
significantly over the years.  Prior to the “open pharmacy” design 
promoted by the chain drug stores starting in the mid 60’s, the 
pharmacist often prepared the medication in the compounding  
laboratory or compounding room of the pharmacy.  This provided a 
quiet work area in which the pharmacist could function without 
interruption. The concept of the open pharmacy placed the pharmacist 
in full view of and with complete access by the public.  Ostensibly this 
was done to make the pharmacist more accessible to the public; it also 
increased the number of interruptions. 
Changes in Pharmacy Practice 
The job function of the pharmacist has changed over time.  In 
the 1930’s and 40’s the pharmacist prepared or compounded most of 
the medications that were dispensed.  This involved blending and then 
pressing powders into a tablet or placing them in capsules, preparing 
elixirs, syrups or solutions.  In short, with the exception of “patent 
medicines” very few drugs were available for direct dispensing to the 
patient.  For example the pharmacist would purchase Digitalis extract 
and then would have to further dilute it for use by a patient. Between 
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1930 and the 1990’s the compounding role of the pharmacist has 
decreased from over 75 percent of prescriptions requiring 
compounding to less than 1%.32  At the same time, the complexity of 
pharmacotherapy necessitated an increase in the cognitive aspects of 
pharmacy.   This transition from “cook book” practice or art of 
pharmacy, to the cognitive or science of pharmacy, resulted in more 
stringent requirements related to education.  The program which 
started as a two year, associate’s degree, in the 1930’s became a six 
year Doctor of Pharmacy (Pharm.D.) in the 1990’s.   
The cognitive functions required for compounding differ 
significantly from those required to evaluate pharmacotherapy.  The 
former process often involved following a “recipe” and was more of an 
art rather than a science.  The latter process involves application of 
pharmacology, physiology and pharmacokinetics. While computer 
systems help with the detection of drug/food and drug/drug 
interactions and potential drug allergies, they do not assist much with 
disease state management and appropriateness of therapy.   
Although the pharmacists workload has increased substantially, 
the work design of a typical modern pharmacy has not changed 
substantially in the last 30 years.  The pharmacist of 20 years ago 
would consider filling 60 to 100 prescriptions per day a fairly heavy 
workload.  Current practice has pharmacists filling upwards of 120 to 
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200 prescriptions per day.  Just as there are no limitations on the work 
hours of a pharmacist, there are no rules that would indicate what 
constitutes a reasonable daily workload.   
The available literature on the correlation between workload and 
dispensing errors is contradictory. Pharmacists believe that high 
workload is directly related to dispensing errors.33  One study found 
that 150 prescriptions would be the median “safe” prescription 
workload while other studies have found no correlation between 
workload and dispensing errors.34,35 
Physiological Factors 
Stress, in itself, is not necessarily harmful.  The concept of 
eustress is well known in human factors.36  Individuals with no stress 
at all in their job become bored and are likely to make more errors 
than an individual under tolerable “stress”.  It is only when stress 
becomes excessive that it produces the physical and psychological 
effects that are associated with stress disorders. 
Some slight exposure to high stress levels will not produce long 
lasting effects, though there are immediate effects on cognitive 
function.  Chronic exposure to high stress situations can induce 
elevations in blood pressure, changes in blood cortisol and a host of 
other physiological and psychological pathologies resulting from the 
body’s response to stress induced hormonal release.37 
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Excessive stress can alter perception, reaction time and 
cognition.38,39 A stressed individual in a highly disruptive work 
environment is more likely to make a cognitive error than one who is 
not stressed.  Fatigue is also well known to interfere with cognitive 
abilities and is included as a stressor.   
Work Disruption 
The sources of disruptions in the pharmacy environment are 
both external and internal.  Examples of external disruptions include 
telephone calls, questions by patients, and the classic “where is the 
motor oil”.  Pharmacists who have worked in the classic “open 
pharmacy” design have often complained about the non-pharmacy 
related questions which present a common source of interruption.  
The internal source of work flow disruption is primarily limited to 
other pharmacy employees.   Individuals taking time to chat when 
they are not busy or when individuals are performing work which they 
believe require low level cognitive functions, can lose focus on the task 
at hand,  the current order on which they are working.   
A study of workflow disruptions, conducted late in 2005, found 
that there were, on average, fifteen interruptions of the processing 
pharmacist per hour.40  Twenty percent of these were external, e.g. 
phone calls, with the remainder being internal and due to non-work 
related internal interruptions by other staff members.  These were 
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occurring while the working pharmacists were in the processing of 
finishing prescriptions.  It was noted that the pharmacist who was 
working was often multitasking, continuing to work on the electronic 
prescriptions while engaged in a conversation with a co-worker. 
Unfortunately there was no approved research protocol to allow follow-
up to determine if this had any impact on prescription errors or 
required edits to avoid an error. 
Facility Overview 
The James A Haley Veterans Administration (VA) Hospital is the 
twelfth busiest facility in the VA Health System.  In the fiscal year 
ending September 30, 2010 there were over 997,000 patient visits. It 
currently provides care to over 80,000 unique individuals and fills over 
100,000 prescriptions per month.41   The pharmacy has a staff of over 
110 individuals, including 60 pharmacists, 45 pharmacy technicians, 
and 5 support and administrative staff.42  The pharmacy is divided into 
four primary sections, in-patient, outpatient, clinical and 
administrative. Staff members are permanently assigned to one of the 
sections.  The in-patient, clinical, and administrative pharmacists are 
cross-trained so they can assist, as needed, in the outpatient 
pharmacy.  Clinical pharmacists assist with order verification when 
unverified prescriptions exceed 4,000 prescriptions on any given day 
or during major holidays when there are anticipated staff shortage in 
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the outpatient pharmacy. This is typically done with the clinical staff 
being authorized over-time while processing prescriptions.  Since the 
overtime rate for VA employees is capped at one and one half time the 
rate for a GS 10, step 10, and the clinical pharmacists are among the 
highest paid individuals in the pharmacy, they are essentially working 
for their standard hourly rate. 
The facility utilizes Physician Order Entry (POE).  That is, all 
medications are ordered on line by the prescriber, eliminating errors 
due to illegible or misinterpreted medication orders.  Once the 
physician enters the order, a pharmacist finishes it.  This has the 
advantage that the orders can be processed by a pharmacist from 
anywhere, including remotely (from home).  This makes the over-time 
requirements for the clinical staff less onerous. 
Role of the Pharmacist 
There are no federal pharmacy practice acts and regulation of 
pharmacists and pharmacies, for the most part is left to the various 
states. The Food and Drug Administration addresses issues with drug 
purity and manufacture; it does not regulate the practice of pharmacy, 
per se. 
The primary role of the pharmacist is to dispense medication.  
The term, “dispense”, includes much more than packaging and placing 
a label on a prescription container.  While there is no single federal 
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rule or regulation that defines this action, the National Association of 
Boards of Pharmacy (NABP) has suggested uniform rules for the 
practice of pharmacy.  These are merely “suggested” legislative 
wording and it is up to each state’s board of pharmacy to determine 
how pharmacy will be practiced in that particular state.   While there 
are state-to-state differences in many sections of the rules, the 
definition of the dispensing act is fairly common across all the states 
and Puerto Rico. 
Florida statutes include in their definition of "dispense":  
 
“… the transfer of possession of one or more doses of a 
medicinal drug by a pharmacist to the ultimate consumer 
or her or his agent. As an element of dispensing, the 
pharmacist shall, prior to the actual physical transfer, 
interpret and assess the prescription order for potential 
adverse reactions, interactions, and dosage regimen he or 
she deems appropriate in the exercise of her or his 
professional judgment, and the pharmacist shall certify 
that the medicinal drug called for by the prescription is 
ready for transfer. The pharmacist shall also provide 
counseling on proper drug usage, either orally or in 
writing, if in the exercise of her or his professional 
judgment counseling is necessary. The actual sales 
transaction and delivery of such drug shall not be 
considered dispensing. The administration shall not be 
considered dispensing.”43 
 
A key element in this definition is the requirement that 
pharmacists “…interpret and assess the prescription order for potential 
adverse reactions, interactions, and dosage regimen she or he deems 
appropriate in the exercise of her or his professional judgment…”  This 
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requires that the pharmacist ensure that the drug, strength, dose, 
dosage form with the correct labeling is provided to the correct 
patient.  It also requires the pharmacist to check the patient’s profile 
to avoid interactions, allergic reactions to a particular drug, over or 
under utilization of the drug (compliance with therapy), 
appropriateness of dose and duration of therapy to the patient’s need.  
An example of the last would be the use of an adult dose in a child or 
failure to adjust a dose for patients with renal impairment or an 
unusual body mass index. This latter cognitive review and methods to 
improve the throughput of this cognitive process are the subject of this 
research. 
Work Environment 
The cognitive and distributive of the outpatient pharmacy have 
been clearly delineated.  The distributive functions are either handled 
by a Consolidated Mail-Out Pharmacy (CMOP), the dispensing robotic 
system44 or a manual fill “line”.  The distributive component of the 
pharmacy is not being considered as part of this research. 
The Consolidated Mail Out Pharmacy used by the facility is one of 
seven located throughout the United States.  Once the pharmacist 
finishes orders entered by the physicians they are electronically 
transmitted to the CMOP each evening.  Over 75 percent of all 
prescriptions filled by the facility are actually filled by CMOP.45  While 
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the prescriptions are filled by CMOP, the local pharmacists have to 
process the order to generate the prescription that is transmitted.   
The cognitive actions of the pharmacist take place at the time of 
order verification.  The facility has Computerized Patient Record 
System (CPRS) which makes use of Computerized Physician Order 
Entry (CPOE); the prescriber creating the order enters it directly into 
the computer system.  The system also includes all patient records, 
such as previous orders, test results, progress notes and other 
relevant medical information involving a patient.  The system is totally 
paperless with the notable exception of a paper prescription and “wet 
signature” requirement for outpatient DEA Class II Controlled 
Substances.  
Because all transactions are entered electronically, legibility 
errors, once both the bane and standard joke about a physician’s 
prescription, become moot.  They have been replaced by selection 
errors, where the prescriber picks the wrong item, which could be a 
patient name, drug, dose or schedule, from a “drop down” list.  While 
interesting, this error is “upstream” from this particular research and is 
not a consideration at this point.  This research will assume that the 
physician has picked the patient, drug, dose and schedule that he or 
she desired. 
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Once the order has been placed by the prescriber, it does not 
become an actual prescription and does not get dispensed until and 
unless the order is finished, or verified, by a registered pharmacist.  
The prescription finishing process is further subdivided into “window 
fills”, where medication is to be picked up by the patient at the 
pharmacy’s outpatient dispensing “windows” or “mail” where the 
medication is to be mailed to the patient, either by CMOP or filled 
locally and then mailed.  The local fill for mail is used for those 
instances where the drug is very rarely used and, as a result, not 
carried by CMOP.  This would also apply to drugs that require special 
shipping or handling requirements.  For example, this would include 
items that require being shipped frozen via next day delivery.  CMOP 
does not handle any DEA Class II controlled substances; any of these 
items that are mailed must be done via local mail. 
Finishing an Order 
When a prescriber enters an electronic order into CPRS there is 
an entry created in the order file.  One the prescriber has entered an 
order for a patient, medication is not dispensed until and unless a 
pharmacist has finished the order.  This step can be done at any 
terminal that is connected to the hospital network and includes users 
who can log into the network from home using a secured, virtual local 
area network (VLAN).  To access the VLAN, the user must have 
 30 
broadband Internet access (at least 200 kbs or better), VA software 
installed on the machine they intend to use to access the VLAN and a 
user ID and security on the VLAN.  This ensures a secure connection to 
access sensitive information.  Sensitive information includes any 
record that has patient specific identifiers, such as name, social 
security number, date of birth or address.  In some cases even the 
complete zip code can be considered an identifier, as can a date of 
admission. 
The finishing process is done entirely on-line and requires that 
the pharmacist has access to the complete electronic record.  Due to 
the design of the system, this usually requires that the pharmacist 
verifying an order has open two or more “windows”.  The primary 
system, Veterans Health Information System and Technology 
Architecture (VISTA) is a “roll and scroll” text only type of interface.  
The second window is the Computerized Patient Record System (CPRS) 
that incorporates a graphical user interface and is used to evaluate 
patient information, read notes, review lab tests and look at consult 
reports.   There are 15 fields that must be reviewed on the electronic 
order for new prescriptions.  In addition to these 15 elements, below, 
the system also generates alerts based or order checks generated at 
the time the order was entered by the prescriber. The system also 
displays the prescriber's response to these order checks.  The items 
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included in the order check are drugs in the same therapeutic drug 
class, drug/drug interactions, alerts to previous adverse reactions to 
the drug or drug class and any allergy alerts to the drug or any 
ingredients in the drug.  For example peanut oil used in the production 
of some inhaled products will generate an alert if the patient had an 
allergy to peanuts.  An allergy and an adverse reaction to a drug are 
not the same.  
The 15 fields that must be reviewed on each new order are: 
1. Actual item ordered by the prescriber.  This is known 
technically as the pharmacy orderable item and includes 
only the drug name and dosage form.  When the prescriber 
selects a dose, this will also select a local drug, which 
includes the drug name and dosage form.  For example an 
orderable item such as Acetaminophen Tablets may have 
doses of 325 mg, 500 mg, 650 mg, and 1000 mg.  If the 
provider selects the 650 mg dose, the system will populate 
the local drug field with Acetaminophen Tablets 325 mg.  If 
the provider selects the 1000 mg dose, the system will 
populate the local drug field with the Acetaminophen 500 
mg tablet.  There are some cases where the provider selects 
the pharmacy orderable item and the local drug field is not 
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populated, in that case the pharmacist must then enter this 
information. 
2. Local drug being used to provide the item that was ordered. 
3. Dosage of the item. This includes the strength, usually in 
mg or gm, the verb, such as “take” or “instill”, the noun, 
such as “capsule” or “drop”, the route, such as “by mouth” 
or “in the eye” and the schedule, such as once a day or 
twice a day. 
4. Ancillary patient instructions, such as “take with food”. 
5. Patient status, such as “non service connected”. 
6. Issue date of the prescription. 
7. Date the prescription is to be filled. 
8. Numbers of days supply being provided in the prescription. 
9. Actual quantity, e.g. tablets, milliliters, or grams dispensed. 
10. Number of refills, if any, allowed. 
11. Routing such as mail or window. 
12. Clinic in which the patient was seen. 
13. Provider (MD, DO, ARNP, PA, RPh) who wrote the order. 
14. Number of copies of the label to be printed. 
15. Ancillary remarks by the pharmacist. 
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The way the system handles alerts is one of the problems 
reported by users.  Figure 1.3 is an example of the initial order 
verification screen.  The system does not prioritize the alert by 
severity and multiple alerts will be triggered for the same interaction 
pair.  
 
For example, two prescriptions commonly used together for the 
treatment of heart failure, digoxin and furosemide, will trigger two 
alerts for possible hypokalemia (low blood potassium); one when the 
digoxin is finished and the other when the furosemide is finished.  This 
leads to concerns about alert fatigue; users are desensitized to the 
Figure 1.4 VISTA Allergy/ADR Screen   
 34 
multiple alerts and therefore do not really read all of them.  This could, 
and has, led to incidence reports where a critical alert is missed due to 
excessive “background clutter”, i.e. the critical alert was mixed in with 
serious alerts.  Responses to alerts such as “OK” or random key 
strokes such as “ASDFG” would indicate that in some cases the alerts 
are not really being read or intellectually processed by the prescriber. 
Alerts are classified as either “critical”, i.e. immediate danger of 
harm or “serious”, possible danger of harm.  Critical alerts must be 
electronically signed and acknowledged by the pharmacist.  Serious 
alerts can be bypassed.  The system does keep a record of who 
bypassed both types of alerts.  Reviewing these alerts can add 
significantly to processing time and can lead to an incidents if the 
pharmacist bypasses an alert which ultimately results in harm to the 
patient. 
The prescriber creates an entry in the order file at the time the 
order is entered, one entry per medication order. When the pharmacist 
finishes the order, a temporary view is created displaying the order 
checks and the entries which will be made in the prescription file upon 
finishing and verifying the order.  Once the pharmacist has reviewed 
these fields, a final view of what will be the prescription entry is 
displayed and the pharmacist is asked to verify that the information is 
correct.  The default entry in “No”; a pharmacist must enter “Y” and a 
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carriage return to complete the process.  At this point the prescription 
is finished and a record is written to the prescription file.  This record 
includes the finishing date/time and the name of the pharmacist who 
finished the order.  At this point the prescription is sent to the 
processing system where it is directed to either the pharmacy 
dispensing robot or queued for the CMOP transmission which occurs 
each evening. 
Once finished, a prescription can be edited, however the 
finishing pharmacist and date/time are not editable and any further 
changes to the prescription are included in an activity log.  It is 
extremely rare, less than one to two events per 100 prescriptions, for 
a prescription to be edited immediately after entry.  Edits are more 
likely to occur if an error is detected when the prescription is filled.  
Since most of the prescriptions (75%) are filled at CMOP, this activity 
usually does not occur until at least four days after the original order is 
finished.  CMOP transmissions or error returns only occur once per day 
and there is an inherent two day lag in CMOP processing; one day for 
transmittal, two day lag and one day for the return transmittal.  CMOP 
returns for error only account for approximately 400 prescriptions per 
month, an extremely small percent of total production.  Approximately 
15 percent of the remaining prescriptions are filled by a robotic 
dispensing system, ScriptPro® leaving less the 10 percent which must 
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be filled manually by pharmacy technicians.  All prescriptions 
processed by either the robot or the technicians are checked by a 
pharmacist using the ScriptPro® System. 
Dispensing also includes selecting the drug, placing it in a 
suitable container with a suitable label and providing it to the correct 
patient.  This latter aspect of dispensing, the actual preparation of the 
drug, is more distributive in nature and can be done with automation 
with very high accuracy, approaching six sigma levels.   This research 
will focus primarily on the cognitive rather than the distributive aspect 
of pharmacy. 
In addition to the new prescription, there is a quasi-new 
prescription which is done via the “renewal” process.  “Renewal” is an 
option to allow the prescriber to rapidly rewrite an order for a 
medication that the patient has already been taking. This is often done 
when the patient has used up the refills on his prescription and the 
prescriber wishes to maintain the same therapy.  A prescription that is 
renewed only has 8 items that can be edited: 
1. Issue date 
2. Fill date 
3. Number of refills 
4. Routing (mail or window) 
5. Clinic  
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6. Provider 
7. Copies 
8. Remarks 
Typically, only the routing is edited.  In most cases the finishing 
pharmacist simply accepts all of the default entries.  The renewal 
process does trigger “order checks”, whereby the system checks for 
and alerts the pharmacist to any drug interactions or potential allergic 
problems.  However, since the medication is a renewal and the patient 
has been on the medication previously, sometimes for a rather lengthy 
time, these alerts are relatively meaningless.  Even if a new 
medication had been started, the alerts to the medication being 
renewed would have been triggered by the addition of the new 
medication and hopefully already reviewed by the pharmacist who 
finished the order for the new medication. Clearly, there is significantly 
less effort required to finish a renewed prescription than there is for a 
new prescription.   
In addition to the order checks for allergies, drug interactions 
and duplicate therapy, there are questions related to whether or not 
the patient will be charged a co-pay based on the drug and the 
patient's service connected conditions. Failure to answer these 
questions correctly can result in the patient being charged a co-pay for 
the prescription when none is due, or not being charged a co-pay 
 38 
when one is required. This may seem trivial but the latter problem has 
resulted in pharmacists being audited by the Inspector General's 
office.  Failure to charge a copay when one is required is considered a 
theft of government resources. 
In order to facilitate prescription processing a report generator 
was written which allows the outpatient pharmacy supervisor to 
generate a report of pending prescriptions which were renewed.  These 
should be capable of being processed faster than new prescriptions.  
The intent was to use this report to more equitably divide workload 
and balance the distribution of new and renewed orders among the 
pharmacists.  There is a concern that this report was not being used 
equitably, which is another reason for the workload statistics to include 
the new and renew prescriptions per pharmacist; any uneven 
distribution of renew to new prescription processing would be evident 
to pharmacy administration. 
Chapter Summary 
The intent of this chapter was to examine some of the cost and 
safety issues associated with processing a prescription and to provide 
an understanding of why productivity, in terms of prescriptions 
processed per hour, is a significant organizational concern. The focus 
of this research is limited to the cognitive function of the pharmacist, 
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that activity associated with the process of converting a physician’s 
order into a prescription.   
Previous studies by the author had discovered that disruptions to 
work flow were relatively common.  A redesign/relocation of the 
pharmacy provided an opportunity to examine if these disruptions had 
an impact on productivity.  The new pharmacy was designed to 
minimize such disruptions and the facility had a database that 
captured the time, to the second, when an order was finished by a 
pharmacist.  These two events provided an opportunity to evaluate the 
impact of such disruptions. 
The remaining chapters in this document will discuss the 
following topics. Chapter Two will review existing literature related to 
this topic.  Chapter Three is a discussion of the methods used to 
examine the impact of the two experimental interventions being used. 
Chapter Four is a review of the results obtained from the data extract 
of the workload data.  Chapter Five is a discussion of the results of the 
research and the relevance of these to the organization.  Chapter Five 
will also detail the conclusions that can be drawn from this research.  
This would include the relevance of this research to other 
organizations.  Finally, justification for further research in the area of 
the effect of production rate on medication error is provided. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Changes in Work 
Workload and stress were not major issues in the practice of 
pharmacy through the first half of the twentieth century.  It was not 
until the practice of pharmacy moved from a sole proprietorship, with 
the pharmacist compounding most of the prescriptions dispensed, to 
the current “chain store” era that concerns about workload and stress 
began to surface.  The practice is undergoing another sea change and 
an increasing number of prescriptions are being filled by mail order 
pharmacies with the large-scale use of robotics to count, bottle and 
label the prescription container.  As robotics are more commonly used 
to prepare the actual medication, the function of the pharmacist is 
becoming more cognitive in nature, with emphasis placed on detecting 
inappropriate doses and drug-drug interactions.   
This shift in function is accompanied by an increasing reliance on 
automation for order entry.  As will be discussed in Chapter Three, the 
study facility is entirely paperless and all orders are electronic in 
nature, utilizing a Computerized Patient Record System (CPRS) and  
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Computerized Physician Order Entry (CPOE).  While this removes 
issues with legibility it creates new issues, primarily dealing with the 
system generated alerts and responses to these alerts.  There is data 
to suggest that vigilance performance, required for detecting, and 
more importantly reacting to, system alerts can be eroded by continual 
exposure.  The requirement for continued vigilance can have a 
significant impact on performance over time. Pharmacists assigned to 
processing prescriptions at the study facility may only do it for a 
portion of their workday, while others have such processing as their 
only responsibility.  The erosion of performance described in the Tiwari 
paper can be seen in a few as fifteen minutes; the increased stress 
leading to decreases in motivation. 46 
The issue of vigilance and response to alerts is relevant to the 
manner in which pharmacists process orders in a CPOE environment.  
In most cases the pharmacist verifying the orders is not responding to 
prompts, but rather is reviewing fields which have already been 
populated by the prescriber and are checked for accuracy, 
appropriateness and proper responses to order checks.  An example of 
the latter action would be over-riding a prescription for Warfarin, an 
anticoagulant, when used with Sulfamethoxazole, commonly used in 
the treatment of urinary tract infections.  This drug-interaction has 
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been known to cause hospital admissions and there are many ways to 
deal with it, such that harm from this combination is inexcusable. 
Since the fields are already populated the pharmacist merely has 
to press the enter key to review the next page, then enter “FI” to 
finish the order, review an example of the finished label and then enter 
“AC” to accept the label.  Some pharmacists have installed shortcuts 
on their keyboard, for example, assigning “A”, “C” and an enter to a 
hot key. By doing this an order can  be completed in as few as three 
strokes  
Stress as a Concern 
In 1978 Curtis et al examined the differences in stress and job 
dissatisfaction between hospital and community based pharmacists.47  
During the latter part of the 1970’s and all through the 80’s, 
researchers were examining workload and stress and their effect on 
pharmacist “burn-out”. The works of Curry, Huff, Radde and Wolfgang 
all examined the effects of stress and work environment and the 
likelihood of pharmacists to become dissatisfied with their work 
environment and change jobs. 48,49,50,51 Their concern was focused on 
pharmacist retention and turn-over rather than dispensing errors.  
Wolfgang, in particular, was interested in the effect of job stress in the 
health professions; as with the other authors of the time, the focus 
was more on staff turn-over than medical mistakes.52,53  
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The Health Professions Stress Inventory was developed by the 
Wolfgangs to measure stress in healthcare professionals.54  Their 
survey instrument measured such factors as interruptions, inadequate 
staffing levels and excessive workloads.55 
Buchanan et al examined the effect of illumination on pharmacy 
dispensing errors and found that there was a direct correlation.  The 
methodology employed direct, undisguised observation and found that 
there was a direct correlation between error rate and illumination 
levels. 56  While illumination levels may be a component of dispensing 
errors, one has to question if the Hawthorne Effect may have been a 
factor in Buchanan’s results.  Further, illumination levels have more of 
an effect on the distributive rather than the cognitive aspect of 
pharmacy and as automation is adopted for the distributive phase, this 
type of error will depend less-and-less on the human element and will 
be more dependent on the design of the automated dispensing 
systems.   
Flynn reviewed the effect of ambient noise in the pharmacy 
workplace and found no real association between noise levels and 
error rate.57  Flynn also examined the susceptibility of pharmacists to 
distractibility, using the Group Embedded Figures test and found an 
association between distractibility, interruptions and medication error 
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rate.  The paper also noted a general association between 
interruptions and error rate.58   
Evans’s paper reinforced the concept of “distractibility” as a 
contributor to dispensing errors.  Pharmacists who had, in Evans’s 
terms, deficits in working memory, i.e. those more easily distracted or 
less capable of multi-tasking, were more likely to make errors.59  
Neither of these authors considered work design issues and were of 
the opinion that reducing the pharmacists’ “distractibility”, i.e. 
teaching them techniques to facilitate multitasking, was an effective 
technique to reduce error.  In other words modify the operators ability 
to deal with the distractions rather than reduce the source of the 
distractions. 
An Australian study by Peterson et al surveyed pharmacists as to 
their beliefs as to the cause of dispensing errors.  Most believed likely 
causes were high prescription volumes, fatigue and interruptions to 
dispensing.60   Bond et al established that US Pharmacists held similar 
opinions.61 
Mott et al conducted surveys examining the reasons for 
pharmacist turn-over.  They found that the stress was increasing as a 
component for job dissatisfaction and turn-over.62  Their concern, like 
those conducted during the preceding three decades, was focused 
more on staff retention than error reduction.   
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As the supply of pharmacists rose relative to demand, many 
organizations became less concerned with turn-over.  The Aggregate 
Job Index for pharmacists in Florida had dipped to 2.5 in January 
2011. The index is based on a scale from 1 to 5, with 3 indicating that 
the supply of workers to jobs is balanced.  An index greater than 3 
indicates a shortage of pharmacists, less than 3 indicates a surplus.  
Figure 2.1 compares the pharmacy manpower index trends over the 
last three years, comparing Florida and National trends.63 As can be 
seen in the chart, pharmacists were in short supply (demanded 
exceeded supply) until mid-2009. 64 The trends for Florida are 
displayed as the lower line on the chart.   
Figure 2.1 Manpower Index Trends  
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Due to the relatively high starting salaries for pharmacists, there 
was an increasing enrollment in pharmacy colleges.  Pharmacy schools 
had projected manpower shortages for the remainder of the decade 
and increased the size of their classes.  Also, some states, such as 
Florida, increased the number of pharmacy colleges.  The financial 
crisis of 2008 decreased the demand for pharmacists at the same time 
schools were beginning to increase the number of graduates.  While 
this is a national phenomenon, some states have been more impacted 
than others; Florida is one of the states where manpower and 
available jobs are close to being balanced but is trending toward a 
surplus of pharmacists.  Unfortunately it is expected that the trend will 
continue downward, especially when two new pharmacy colleges in the 
state start graduating their first classes. 
Schell et al examined the effects of anxiety and workload on 
stress in a simulated pharmacy environment.  Grasha also used a 
simulated work environment to measure the effects of stress and 
interruptions on dispensing errors.65,66,67  Some of his observations 
included “Pharmacists were more vulnerable to mistakes under low 
workload conditions and when shifting from high to low activity. 
Boredom, reduced task focus, and disruptions in personal work 
rhythms made it hard to focus on tasks, even though pharmacists with 
both low and high workloads were equally concerned about their 
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performance and were motivated to do well.”68   It must be noted that 
these studies were either based on direct observation or simulations.    
This research will evaluate changing the physical environment, 
reducing disruptions to the pharmacists entering orders, and the use 
of published workload reports as a mechanism to increase productivity. 
An indicator for error, based on CMOP reported incidence rates, will be 
used to evaluate the errors that are not caught by pharmacists during 
order verification and get passed through to prescriptions sent to 
CMOP.  The errors reported by CMOP do not consider those due to 
ignoring alerts such as those for drug interactions, allergy or duplicate 
drug therapy however they would be considered an indicator of how 
thoroughly the pharmacist has reviewed the order.   Another indicator 
of error will be the trends in orders which are discontinued by the 
pharmacist during the order verification process. The rationale for this 
approach will be discussed further in Chapter Three. 
Rolland reviewed medication errors at a VA facility and reported 
that drug and patient selection were the two most common sources of 
errors.  It was concluded that “Focusing error reduction efforts on 
selection of the correct drug and correct patient would likely yield the 
best results in reducing dispensing errors since these errors combined 
accounted for 55 (67.1%) of the 82 reported errors”. 69  It is not 
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known, at this time, what modifications to work design are being 
recommended by Rolland. 
Pharmacy Workload 
The number of prescriptions being filled in the United States is 
increasing more rapidly than the population.  Per capita prescription 
drug use increased from 10.1 prescriptions per person in 1999 to 12.6 
in 2009.70  A study by the University of North Carolina (UNC) found 
that a “typical” pharmacist increased productivity from one 
prescription every eight minutes, in 1999, to one every five minutes in 
2000.71  As will be seen, there are studies indicating that this 
production rate is now closer to just over four minutes per 
prescription, more than 14 prescriptions per hour, sometimes much 
higher. The UNC study indicated that it was a shortage of pharmacists 
that was responsible for this increase in individual workload.  This may 
be true for North Carolina, which tends to have a shortage of 
pharmacists, relative to the available jobs, and historically tends to 
have better job outlooks for pharmacists than the national average. 
This is not reflective of conditions in the southeast US, the location of 
the study facility.72 
The reasons for this increase in prescription drug use per capita 
is beyond the scope of this research but one significant factor may be 
the ability of pharmaceutical companies to market their products direct 
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to the consumer, spending twice as much on marketing than they do 
on research.73  In addition to direct to consumer advertising, drug 
companies have expanded their marketing activities with physicians.  
In 2006 there was one marketing representative for every nine 
physicians compared to one for every eighteen in 1996.74 The net 
effect of all of this is the concept of a “pill for every ill” and an increase 
demand for pharmaceuticals. 
Malone et al examined the effect of workload on pharmacists 
dispensing errors and determined that there was “...an increase in the 
risk of dispensing a potential DDI with higher pharmacist and 
pharmacy workload...”75 This was strictly a survey of “potential” drug-
drug interactions and there was no indication of any actual patient 
harm.  While a significant correlation was found between workload and 
potential errors there were no changes made to the work environment 
of the pharmacies that were surveyed.  One of the interesting items to 
come out of the study was an estimate of the number of prescriptions 
filled per pharmacist per hour.  Their calculation was based on the 
total number of prescriptions filled per week divided by the total 
number of pharmacists’ hours per week.  The mean prescriptions filled 
per pharmacist per hour were 14.1 with a range of 2.9 to 41.5.  The 
method for processing prescriptions was significantly different from 
that of the study facility where the duties of the pharmacists 
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processing orders was separated from the pharmacists and technicians 
filling the actual prescription. 
An article in Pharmacy times reviewed survey results of 
pharmacists’ perception of their work environment.  The survey 
indicated that pharmacists were becoming alarmed about the impact 
of workload on possible errors.  Two interesting results of the survey 
were “36% of the pharmacists surveyed said that the growing 
workload has negatively affected their ability to reduce medication 
errors;” and “33% said that workload pressures are harming their 
ability to solve drug-therapy problems.”76 
Another indicator that workload may be a factor in medication 
errors is based on a study which found a 25% increase in medication 
error related deaths at the beginning of each month.  The authors 
postulated that since government payments to beneficiaries occurred 
the first part of each month, and there were noticeable spikes in 
prescription workload the first of each month, these deaths might be 
related to increased workload.77  This argument is somewhat tenuous 
but does merit further review.  
At this time the boards of pharmacy of only a few states have 
recognized the potential impact of workload and stress on error.  North 
Carolina has taken enforcement action limiting work load and hours 
against a pharmacist brought before the board of pharmacy for 
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dispensing errors.  That action included a restriction on the pharmacist 
to fill no more than 150 prescriptions per day and further limited his 
work week to no more than 40 hours per week and no more than eight 
hours per day. This could amount to filling more than 19 prescriptions 
per hour; a volume that other reports indicate may still be too high for 
safety.  One of the problems with this assumption is that it presumes 
prescriptions come in at a constant rate.  Anyone who has worked in 
the retail sector knows that this is not true and there are peak times 
for prescription load; the work does not come in at a constant rate.  
Fortunately the subjects of this research controlled their own rate, the 
work queue was saturated so there was no cyclical change in load for 
the study pharmacists.   
Pharmacists often cite workload in an attempt to mitigate 
adverse board actions.  In a response to the above mentioned board 
action in North Carolina, the pharmacist used as his defense: 
“Respondent testified that he believed that the errors were 
due to filling high volumes of prescriptions, working long 
hours, and improper supervision of pharmacy technicians, 
as well as due to significant life stressors that he was 
experiencing at the time the above-stated errors 
occurred.”78  
 
North Carolina has also set rules limiting a pharmacist’s workday 
to no more than twelve hours. The rules also provide for a thirty-
minute meal period and an additional fifteen-minute break for any 
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pharmacist working more than six hours.79  The effect of breaks and 
meal periods will not be an issue for the test site.  Labor rules for 
federal employees dictate a 30-minute meal period and two fifteen 
minute breaks for every eight-hour shift.  
As can be seen in Figure 2.2, Data from MEDMARX® indicates 
that close to three-quarters of the contributing factors to high alert 
medication errors were staffing (31%), distractions (29%) and 
Workload Increase (12%). While it might seem counter-intuitive, 
based on board actions where the defendant pharmacist cited stress 
and fatigue as factors in the error, the MEDMARX data indicated only 
2% of high alert medication errors were due to fatigue. 80 One possible 
observation for this may be the fact that the MEDMARX data is 
primarily accumulated from approximately 400 large healthcare 
Staffing, 31%
Distractions, 29%
Workload 
Increase, 12%
Other, 28%
Figure 2.2 MEDMARX Data  
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facilities while the board actions cited occurred in community based 
pharmacies.  Of particular interest is the effect of distractions on these 
errors.  It was disruptions to workflow that were discovered in the 
study by Coblio et al that prompted further research at the facility.  
Alarm Fatigue 
The role of system false alerts and high alert rate cannot be 
minimized.  A false alert results when the system alerts the pharmacist 
or prescriber to an allergy or drug/drug interaction that does not really 
exist.   For example, generating an alert for a drug interaction alert to 
topical ketoconazole and some drugs, such as Amiodarone, used to 
manage cardiac dysrhythmias.  While this would be a serious 
interaction for orally administered ketoconazole, there is practically no 
absorption of the drug through intact skin and thus no real drug/drug 
interaction. 
There is growing evidence that while automation can reduce 
some types of error, other types of errors can actually be induced by 
systems.  The effect of repeated low-level or false alarms contributes 
to “alarm or alert fatigue”; crucial information is lost in the “noise” of 
the other alerts.81,82,83 It is beyond the scope of this research to 
examine the effect of alert overload or fatigue on error rate; this 
research focuses on productivity.  However, as will be discussed in 
Chapter Five, these effects must be kept in mind when evaluating 
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systems changes made to increase productivity.  As the number of 
orders to be processed per unit time increases, and the number of 
alerts also increases, is less time being spent evaluating these alerts?  
This is particularly an issue if the pharmacists are aware that there is a 
high incidence of false or very low level alerts. 
Staff Turn-Over and Stress 
Much of the early research on pharmacist stress and burnout has 
been focused on staff retention and recruitment.  Stress, burnout, high 
staff turn-over and error rates are most likely related.  As noted in the 
Peterson and Bond papers, surveys of working pharmacists indicated 
that work design was a significant factor in dispensing errors.  Work 
design is also a significant factor in stress, burnout and turn-over. 
Pharmacists often find themselves in situations where they are 
either confronted with high workloads or long hours or both.  High 
turn-over increases staff pressure as they strive to keep up with work 
while training new pharmacists to eventually assist in the work.  This 
in turn leads to more stress and further loss of staff.  In some 
organizations this has led to spiraling changes in personnel such that 
few staff members have a grasp on the subtle, unwritten, “procedures” 
that facilitated operation of the department.     
Another causative factor for increased work hours is quite simply 
a factor of management focus on reducing salaries.  While this is not 
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yet a common factor in government facilities there is an incentive in 
the private sector to use two full time employees working sixty hours 
each to accomplish the work of three employees.  The economics of 
this management decision becomes self-evident when viewed in light 
of the facts which are detailed below. 
Pharmacists typically are paid more than the Social Security 
Maximum tax.  In  2011 this was 106,800.84 There is no requirement 
for over-time pay for pharmacists.  Even in the government sector, 
over-time rate is capped at one and one half times the salary of a 
GS10, step 10.  This is slightly lower than the salary of most of the 
pharmacist who are in the GS12 wage grade or higher.  Office of 
Personnel Management directives dictate a person cannot be paid less 
than their normal hourly rate for over-time, so in most cases, 
pharmacists are working over-time for their normal hourly rate. 
Since the benefits are fixed, the rationale for using two 
individuals working sixty hours each, to cover one hundred twenty 
hours, results in a savings of approximately 28% (approximately 
$30,000 per year) of a person's salary.  In addition to the cost 
advantage of working pharmacists long work weeks there was also a 
scheduling advantage for assigning pharmacists to twelve hour days.  
It was far easier for pharmacy district managers to schedule two 
pharmacists working twelve hour shifts than scheduling three 
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pharmacists.  Many pharmacists in the retail sector have been working 
12-hour days for 60-hour shifts since the mid 1970's.  Initially this was 
due to a shortage of pharmacists; there were not enough individuals to 
cover the available hours.  However as noted in the pharmacy 
manpower data, above, there is currently an adequate supply of 
pharmacists so one has to consider the cost and ease of scheduling as 
primary factors for these schedules.    
Rules in Other Industries and Countries 
This increase in workload and resultant increase in stress is not 
isolated to the practice of pharmacy. WFD, a consulting company 
surveyed business leaders and “work life experts” found that “Eight 
out of 10 respondents report that managers and employees workloads 
have increased, along with employee stress. At the same time, half of 
respondents report that employee motivation, energy, and endurance 
have all decreased.”85 
The aviation industry has established a fairly impressive record 
for safety and is often cited in the medical literature as a model for 
developing safe systems.  This has been done through formalized rules 
for work processes for all members of the flight crew and air traffic 
control  The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has imposed limits 
on the number of hours pilots can fly and the number of crew required 
for each type of aircraft; accidents are thoroughly investigated to 
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determine if changes in these standards are necessary.  This not only 
applies to the pilots and crew of the aircraft but to air traffic 
controllers.86 
The FAA constantly reviews issues that may have an impact on 
an air crew’s or air traffic controller’s cognitive abilities and is acutely 
aware of the effect of stress and fatigue on these abilities.  As a result, 
time at work and rest requirements are continually being updated.87   
Unfortunately, organizational culture in the healthcare industry 
has prevented the wholesale adoption of similar regulations.  A 
possible reason for this failure to adopt such guidelines is the fact that 
there is no “Federal Pharmacy Administration”; the profession of 
pharmacy is regulated at the level of the state rather than the federal 
government.   
From the international perspective, the European Union has 
established standards for allowable work hours for all employees.   The 
motives for the EU standards are not only for safety, there are 
economic incentives to limit the workweek; limiting over-time makes 
jobs available for other workers.  In most EU countries these rules 
currently limit the hours an individual can work to no more than 48 
hours per calendar week.88 
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Chapter Summary 
Stress and fatigue are cited by pharmacists as factors 
contributing to medications errors made by pharmacists.  Unlike other 
industries, such as transportation, there are no federal regulations that 
set work hours or workload. There are few state guidelines; those that 
exist are often recommendations or guidelines as opposed to 
enforceable regulation.  The workload for pharmacists is increasing 
and while there is no shortage of pharmacists in Florida, and the 
national workload index seems to be trending toward balance, there is 
a both a financial and ease of staffing incentive for pharmacy 
managers to increase per pharmacist workload rather than hire more 
pharmacists.  At this point in time there is no agreement on what 
constitutes a safe prescription workload, with an apparent range of 14 
prescriptions per hour to over 19 prescriptions per hour.  In the United 
States there are no limits on the total hours a pharmacist can work per 
calendar week.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 RESEARCH METHODS 
 
Design Overview and System Limitations 
In an effort to reduce operating costs, the facility has initiated 
process improvement activities for all departments within the 
organization.  Within the organization, pharmacy costs are among the 
highest.  Unlike community hospitals, which have small outpatient 
sections, if they have one at all, VA facilities provide total outpatient 
care.  As a result, the outpatient pharmacy accounts for a majority of 
pharmacy staff, incurs the highest departmental costs and is the 
busiest part of the pharmacy.   This would make it the most likely 
candidate for process improvement activities.  
There are data indicating that some of the processing problems 
in the outpatient pharmacy are due to design issues with the 
pharmacy software.  The department of Veterans' Affairs removed the 
Office of Information and Technology (OI&T) out from under the Under 
Secretary for Health, creating a separate office that reported directly 
to the Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs.  This added level of 
bureaucracy makes software changes difficult to make.  Requests for 
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changes, New Service Requests (NSR's), must be sent up the VHA 
chain of command and then are routed to OI&T, where there the 
process of review starts all over again.  NSR's are required for any 
requested changes.  Due to staffing cutbacks in OI&T, most of the 
system design changes are handled by contract.  As a result, the 
processing of NSR's can take years to accomplish.   
The reason for this organizational change at the National Level is 
beyond the scope of this document but is related to system 
management issues.  These related to problems with a project, the 
Core Financial and Logistics systems (CoreFLS), a financial 
management system which was a total failure and cost the VA over 
249 million dollars.89  This project management failure resulted in the 
forced resignations of an under-secretary for health, a facility director, 
chief of staff and other individuals in management positions with the 
project.  This occurred in 2004 and due to the projects poor over-sight 
by VHA, led to the creation of OI&T. Unfortunately, the VA Office of 
Inspector General's report on OI&T project management indicated, at 
least as recently as September 30, 2009, that there were still major 
problems with project management within OI&T.90 
Because system design changes are not possible at this point, it   
was decided to focus on work design in the outpatient area as the 
focus for process improvement.  The distributive aspects of the 
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pharmacy are highly automated.  The facility uses a robotic fill system 
designed by ScriptPro®. This system is very efficient and fault 
tolerant.    As mentioned in Chapter One, the robotic dispensing 
systems in pharmacy are close to operating at a six-sigma level and 
dispensing errors where the wrong medication is in the prescription 
container is extremely rare.  In instances where such events were 
reported by the patient, it was discovered that the patient had 
inadvertently transferred the contents of one container to another.  
Due to the high efficiency of the robotic systems, it was decided that 
the finishing of the prescription, the processing component, was the 
most viable candidate for process improvement. 
The current design and operation of the outpatient pharmacy 
was discussed at length in Chapter One.  As a quick summary, the 
functions of the outpatient area are clearly delineated into the 
production and processing areas.  The processing areas are further 
divided into the 'window fill” area, where pharmacists interact with 
patients while finishing their prescriptions on line, and the mail area 
where the pharmacists primarily work on the computer finishing 
prescriptions with no patient interaction.  The majority of disruptions 
to flow for the pharmacists processing mail prescriptions were 
identified as either from phone calls or other staff members. 91,92 The 
processing pharmacists require more attention to detail than the 
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pharmacists and technicians working in the production area.  The 
production area is more oriented towards order fulfillment, the primary 
responsibility of staff there is to ensure that the correct medication is 
in the prescription container and that the correct label is attached to 
the container.   That is primarily controlled by the robotic system.  It is 
the finishing or processing pharmacist who must ensure that there are 
no interactions, the drug is appropriate and exercise all of the other 
“clinical” functions of the pharmacist.   
Those prescriptions, which are filled locally, are processed by the 
robotic dispensing system, ScriptPro® or are filled manually.  All 
prescriptions filled locally are processed by ScriptPro® but only 
approximately 200 drugs are filled by the robot.  The remainder are 
filled with manual fill systems, either picking unit–of-use packages 
such as ointments, ophthalmic solutions or bottles of oral liquids or 
using manual tablet counting devices such as those made by Kirby-
Lester.   
No matter which process is used, all items are processed using 
the ScriptPro® systems which uses bar code technology to ensure the 
correct mediation is in the prescription container. Both of these 
systems, ScriptPro and CMOP operate at close to six sigma levels for 
accuracy.  Since finishing the prescription is the critical point in the 
process and is required for all prescriptions, this cognitive component, 
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the finishing or processing of prescriptions by the outpatient pharmacy 
was selected for study. 
Consolidated Mail-Out Pharmacy 
While all prescriptions to be filled must be finished by a 
pharmacist, most of the actual production of the finished order is done 
by the Consolidated Mail-Out Pharmacy (CMOP).  Over 75% of all 
prescriptions finished by the outpatient pharmacy are sent to CMOP to 
be mailed to the patient.  CMOP has invested heavily in automated 
dispensing equipment and can process close to one hundred thousand 
prescriptions per day.  The CMOP in Charleston in one of seven VA 
CMOPs located throughout the United States.  Prescriptions are 
electronically transmitted to CMOP once a day, in the evening. 
The CMOP uses automation to not only fill and process 
prescriptions but has systems to detect simple errors in prescriptions.  
For example, CMOP will reject back to the facility any prescription 
which contains prohibited abbreviations, for example “cc” rather than 
“ML” and “U” when used as an abbreviation for “units”. 
Figure 3.1 is a photograph of one of the automated CMOP fill 
lines.  At this point, the prescription containers are already labeled 
with a suitable prescription label and are in “pucks” which have RFID 
devices which are encrypted with the prescriptions information 
including the patient, drug, strength and number of oral solid doses to 
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place in the prescription container or containers.  The VA encourages 
the use of 90 days’ supply of medication whenever it is prudent to do 
so; as a result there is often a need to place large quantities of 
medication in multiple containers for the same prescriptions; the 
system can accommodate multiple containers.   
One of the advantages of using CMOP is that the system can also 
accommodate handling the unit-of-use packaging.  The system uses 
an “A Frame” rack and the packages are labeled with an appropriate 
label and dropped into “tote” with one “tote” for each patient.  All 
prescriptions are sent to packaging stations where bar codes are used 
to ensure that all of the medications are for the patient being checked 
and that the patient has all of the prescriptions which are supposed to 
be in the order. 
Figure 3.1 CMOP Fill Line  
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A photograph of one of the “A Frames” is included as Figure 3.2.  
As can be seen in the photo each rack carries a large selection of 
different pre-packed items. 
The production costs for CMOP, per prescription, are estimated 
to be $1.50 to $1.75 less those of the local facility.93  The reason for 
this is due to the economies of scale that result from such a large 
operation.  Their lower costs are due to the high use of automation 
and the use of mail consolidators that reduce postage costs.  This is 
the reason that facilities keep track of percent CMOP utilization for 
their mailed prescriptions.  It must be kept in mind that CMOP does 
not provide any cognitive services.  All prescribers’ orders which are 
Figure 3.2 CMOP A-Frame 
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finished into prescriptions are processed by pharmacists at the local 
facility. 
While not part of the study, the CMOP also fills the refilled 
prescriptions which are processed by the pharmacy technicians at the 
local facility.  Refill prescriptions account for slightly less than half 
(48%) of all prescriptions processed. 
Design of Physical Plant 
As mentioned previously, earlier studies found that there were 
many internal disruptions to work flow, i.e. disruptions due to other 
employees interrupting pharmacists who were finishing prescriptions.  
These disruptions were due in large part to the design of the 
outpatient pharmacy which caused a great deal of traffic along the 
cubicles where the pharmacists were finishing prescription.  A 
schematic of the general design of the area is included as Appendix A. 
The outpatient pharmacy was relocated from the first floor of the 
hospital in the early 90’s, circa 1992.  This move was required due to a 
need to open more patient clinics on the first floor of the hospital.  It 
was at this time that the pharmacy administrative offices were moved 
from an area opposite the outpatient pharmacy to a modular building 
outside the hospital. 
The outpatient pharmacy was split into two levels, one on the 
basement level and the other on the first floor of the hospital, 
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immediately above the lower level and connected to it via two, small, 
side-by-side elevators capable of carrying approximately a one 
hundred pound load.  The actual processing area was in the basement 
where prescriptions were finished, placed in bags and sent up to the 
first floor via one of the elevators.  The first floor pharmacy was for 
prescription drop off and pick up. 
The outpatient pharmacy was moved to an open work area of 
approximately 9,800 square feet.  The only area which had a floor to 
ceiling wall was a small office area, designated as “Printers” in the 
drawing where all of the outpatient label and report printers were 
located.  All four walls and ceiling of this large area were concrete 
(ceiling) or concrete block so there was no need to have floor to ceiling 
walls for the narcotic storage area.  However, to ensure adequate 
security for the outpatient controlled substances area, the entire 
pharmacy was under positive security and the only access was via a 
magnetic key card and a punch lock, latter replaced by a biometric 
hand reader.  VA rules for storage of medications require at least two 
locks at all times. 
The pharmacists finishing orders were located in cubicles located 
in the same area as the outpatient dispensing area.  This area included 
the break area, the working stock storage area, the prescription fill 
area and the pharmacy dispensing robotic device.  This system 
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contributed to the ambient noise level in the area.  The robotic 
dispensing system, in particular has a relatively high noise level.    
The room had a concrete ceiling so there was no acoustic 
damping of any environmental noise.  In addition to the noise of the 
robot, the technicians used Kirby Lester tablet counters for the manual 
fill of medication not in the robot.  These make a clacking sound as 
tablets or capsules are poured through the shoots into the prescription 
container.  Such manual fills account for only 10% of the pharmacy 
workload but that would include refills as well and amount to 200 to 
300 prescriptions per working day. 
Adding further environmental “noise” was the fact that the coffee 
and break area was located at the end of the row of cubicles used by 
the pharmacists assigned to finish orders. It was not uncommon for 
individuals on their way to get coffee, or take a break, to stop by the 
cubicles and chat with their colleagues who were processing 
prescriptions.  
The entry door for mail room staff to pick up the prescriptions 
which were mailed locally was located at one end of the cubicles and 
the main entry door to the outpatient pharmacy was at the other.  The 
pharmacy is a secure area and entry was via a magnetic card.  Anyone 
wanting to come in to the pharmacy had to ring a bell.  Since the 
pharmacists in the end cubicle (labeled Cubicle 4 in the diagram) were 
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closest to the door, one of them often was interrupted to open the 
door.  Mail room staff also had to ring for admission to the mail room 
entry door, but this interruption was limited to once per day.  Local 
mail only accounts from approximately 4,200 prescriptions per month. 
This design was patently inefficient.  The elevators were 
consistently requiring maintenance and there was continual movement 
of stock into and out of the department within yards of where the 
pharmacists were finishing orders. As mentioned previously, there was 
also a great deal of moment of staff along the isle where the cubicles 
were located as they went to get coffee. 
The cubicles were designed to accommodate two pharmacists, 
working with their chairs back to back.  The walls facing the isle were 
four feet high and there were no doors on the cubicles.   There had 
been no budget for office furniture when the cubicles were set up so 
chairs were not standardized and were what was available from facility 
surplus.  
The walls between cubicles were six feet high and included a 
bookcase for references with a fluorescent light under the bookcase.  
All of the cubicles used Herman Miller modular units which had been 
used in the outpatient pharmacy when it had been located on the first 
floor of the hospital and was relocated in 1993. 
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There was no back wall to the cubicle as the desk units were up 
against the block wall of the pharmacy.  This, and all of the walls of 
the outpatient pharmacy, was painted in the traditional “institutional” 
yellow which was common for non-patient care areas. 
Relocation and Redesign of the Outpatient Pharmacy 
The facility has very little available space to provide additional 
services, and has moved a number of modular buildings on to an 
already crowed campus.  Changes in federal regulations required 
additional requirements for the inpatient IV room.  In order for the 
facility to meet United States Pharmacopeia (USP) standards it was 
necessary to relocate the inpatient pharmacy. 94  The only space 
available to the hospital was the existing outpatient pharmacy. 
The facility administration decided that it was time to move the 
outpatient pharmacy offsite.  This would not only resolve some of the 
problems with space but offload some of the parking problems that 
were being compounded by having to convert parking lots into 
locations for temporary structures.  A suitable building, approximately 
one quarter mile from the hospital became available when Tower 
Diagnostics decided to relocate one of their facilities and the facility 
made arrangements to lease slightly less than 10,000 square feet of 
space in this facility.  Any lease of 10,000 square feet or more would 
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have required approval from Central Office and would have 
substantially delayed the lease negotiations.  
This relocation was first suggested in 1996, during a functional 
analysis of the VA Outpatient Pharmacy by a team from the 
Department of Industrial and Management Systems, College of 
Engineering of the University of South Florida.95  The relocation was 
suggested due to many problematic areas noted in the physical plant.  
This 1996 study first mentioned the disruptions to work flow due to the 
poor design and that the separation of the department into two floors 
built lag into the system at a time when the organization was 
attempting to reduce pharmacy wait time.  
The relocation of the outpatient pharmacy allowed pharmacy 
administration an opportunity to redesign the physical layout.  The 
design was coordinated by the director of pharmacy and the facilities 
interior designer.  A schematic of this new design is located in 
Appendix B.  The leased building was essentially gutted and the facility 
interior decorator and facility safety office coordinated with the 
director of pharmacy to design the new pharmacy.   
The pharmacists finishing prescriptions were physically 
separated from the dispensing area and were not in a high traffic area.   
The pharmacists finishing orders were located in individual offices.  
These offices were designed to have optimum lighting and the budget 
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for the move included monies for new furniture, including IKEA 
desktops, bookcases and ergonomic chairs and keyboard wrist 
supports.  All computer displays were fitted with anti-glare screens and 
the office lighting used fluorescent lighting fixtures recessed into the 
ceiling. 
There was not traffic flow around the offices and the dispensing 
area and robot were located in another work area separated by fire 
doors.  The main entrance to the outpatient pharmacy opened into the 
patient waiting area and access to the finishing area did not require 
going through locked doors.  There was an outside entrance which was 
locked however that was not for general use and was only used for 
deliveries.  When this door was required to be opened it was done so 
by the pharmacy receiving clerk and not the pharmacists.  While the 
processing area was separated from the dispensing area, the area was 
still considered a high security area and as a result there were no 
windows in the offices.  However the walls were drywall painted a light 
shade of green. 
Pharmacy management was concerned about productivity and 
was aware that the previous pharmacy design had many internal 
disruptions that could have an impact on productivity.  The relocation 
provided the opportunity to see if this was indeed the case or if there 
 73 
were other factors that may have had an impact on prescription 
throughput by the pharmacists assigned to finishing prescriptions. 
While it is not related to workload, the new pharmacy included a 
drive-through pharmacy window to facilitate the pickup of medications.  
This did not have an impact on productivity and was not well received 
by pharmacy staff, whose main concern was the image of a drive-
through window and associated that with “retail” pharmacy.  During an 
accreditation visit for the PGY-2 Pharmacy Informatics Residency by 
the American Society of Health-Systems Pharmacist (ASHP) comments 
were also made about the drive-through window.96  While not held in 
high regard by staff or professional organizations the Redesign of the 
outpatient pharmacy included a drive-through window whereby 
patients could pick up medication without leaving their vehicle.  This 
and the general organization were well received by the patients as 
evidenced by the Survey of the Healthcare Experiences of Patients 
(SHEP) scores on pharmacy satisfaction before and after the redesign 
and relocation. 
Productivity Reports 
As discussed in the previous chapter, another effective tool in 
increasing productivity is to publicly post the outcomes monitors; 
individuals can see where they stand relative to their peers.  In the 
summer of 2010 the pharmacy staff was consistently one to three 
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thousand prescriptions behind.  This was no demonstrable 
improvement over the number of pending prescriptions prior to the 
pharmacy relocation.   
Unfortunately the pharmacy software had no standardized 
reports that dealt with individual productivity. There were two fields in 
the prescription record that indicated when and who actually finished 
the prescription and it was decided to use these to develop a local 
pharmacy workload database.  This data base was then used to 
generate monthly reports, one of supervisors and one which was 
posted for the staff.  
A union, the American Federation of Government Employees 
(AFGE), represents pharmacy staff.  In order to avoid any possible 
issues with the union, the names of the pharmacists were not included 
on the publicly available information.  The names were de-identified, 
using a random key, and only these id numbers and a monthly 
summary were posted. The pharmacy data manager maintained the 
key to identify the specific pharmacist for each ID number and 
provided that information, on an individual basis, so that pharmacists 
could track their own performance relative to their peers. Since the 
data was a monthly total, and includes data from all pharmacists who 
may fill a prescription it was determined that it would be very difficult, 
if not impossible, for a pharmacist to deduce another pharmacists ID 
 75 
simply by knowing if a person was on vacation that month.  The chart 
includes a number of low monthly totals.  This can be due to a number 
of reasons, for example, clinical staff helping out to catch up on 
backlog or working over-time to perform mandated drug therapy 
conversion.  The numbers are re-assigned yearly, so that even if an 
individual were to deduce another pharmacist's ID number, it would be 
changed at some random point in the year.  So that they can request 
their new ID number, all staff members are advised when the numbers 
are again randomized.   
Supervisors are given both summary and detail charts (by day) 
that include the names of the pharmacists.  Individuals who are not 
performing to expectation are counseled by the outpatient pharmacy 
supervisor and encouraged to do better.   
Pharmacy administration was curious as to which of either of 
these changes to the outpatient pharmacy had an impact on 
productivity and if so, how much.  Table 3.1 is an example of the data 
that is publicly posted for the preceding month.  This is usually posted 
by the end of the first full week in the next month.  It was determined 
that, for posting purposes, the monthly total Renewed (R) and New 
(N) would provide users with a fairly good overview of finished 
prescriptions and where they placed relative to the other pharmacists 
in the department.  Supervisors are provided with a copy of a detailed 
 76 
report which includes the pharmacists’ names and productivity by day, 
with summation by total per day and total per month. The difference in 
complexity and therefore processing time between New and Renewed 
prescriptions will be discussed later.   
Table 3.1 Sample Productivity Report  
Person ID Total R Total N Grand Total 
9342063  600  1,546  2,146 
58934913  672  595  1,267 
167274147  1,161  2,940  4,101 
 
This is just a representative sample and does not include all of 
the data.  Appendix C is a complete chart, for the month of April 2011 
for the satellite pharmacy in New Port Richey (Pasco County). 
HIPAA and IRB Compliance 
The study does not capture any patient information.  The data is 
extracted from an existing workload database which itself is based on 
an extract from the facility’s data store. The only data in the database 
is the date and time a pharmacist finishes a prescription, the identity 
of the finishing pharmacist, whether the prescription was a new or 
renewed prescription and whether or not it was mailed or filled locally.  
As a result, no waiver of HIPAA is required.  Since no patient 
information is captured and the tool in use is part of the pharmacy 
workload reporting system, IRB approval is not required. 
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Data Collection 
Four data elements were collected, the finish date/time, finishing 
pharmacist, prescription routing (mail or window) and prescription 
type (new or renew) was extracted from the pharmacy workload 
database for the period April 1, 2008 through April 30, 2011. The 
“finish date/time” is the date and time, to the second, that a 
pharmacist processed a physician’s order into a prescription.  Only 
pharmacists can perform this task and requires a specific electronic 
key (PSORPH).  The finishing pharmacist is the pharmacist who 
processed the order.  This database itself is based on an extract from 
the prescription file and is used solely to measure pharmacist 
productivity.  As mentioned above, this extract contains no patient 
information and the pharmacist's information has been de-identified. 
In addition to the standard workload extracts, an extract of 
CMOP reported errors for the facility was obtained from the CMOP 
error reporting system.  Unfortunately the CMOP data does not cover 
the entire study interval; the available data is only from December 
2009 through April 2011.  The CMOP errors would be limited to those 
that indicated an error on the prescription that would prevent it from 
being processed by CMOP and rejected back to the facility.  These can 
be rather trivial such as a misspelled word in the patient instructions 
or a dispense quantity which was not an integer multiple of items 
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dispensed by CMOP, for example a prescription indicating a dispense 
quantity of 90 for items which can only be dispensed in multiples of 
100.  Since the acceptable dispense quantity is included in the 
processing screen, a prescription processed with a non-integer 
multiple of the quantity would indicate a lack of vigilance on the part 
of the pharmacist processing the order.  While this error may seem 
trivial, it can result in a significant delay in the patient receiving their 
medication.  The rejected prescription is sent back to the facility, has 
to be edited, re-transmitted back to CMOP and then processed by 
CMOP.  This can add five days or more to the processing time, so that 
rather instead of 10 days, the normal time allowed for processing, a 
rejected prescription can take 15 days or longer to get to the patient.  
There is no argument that there should be systems in place to 
automatically populate the quantity to be dispensed field with integer 
multiples of the allowed dispense quantity, based on the day’s supply 
of medication to be provided.  Unfortunately, at this time, the system 
does not have that capability. 
The data elements captured from CMOP are simply month, and 
rejected prescriptions by reject category.  Only those categories due to 
an error were used.  A category for rejects beyond the control of the 
finishing pharmacist; for example, “out of stock” or “item on back 
order” was excluded. 
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Another possible error indicator would be orders that were either 
discontinued by the pharmacist for cause, e.g. a drug that caused a 
serious drug interaction and was not processed, or due to an edit of 
one of the fields in the orders that automatically generates a new 
order.  For example if the pharmacist edits the dose of the drug, the 
system automatically generates a new order to be signed by the 
prescriber.  Unfortunately the study did not have approval from IRB to 
extract patient sensitive information so the exact reason for the 
discontinuance or edit cannot be elucidated.   
While the number of orders discontinued or discontinued due to 
edit cannot be used to determine error rates, they may be an indicator 
of how much attention the pharmacist is paying to the various fields of 
the order. A decrease in discontinued orders associated with an 
increase in per hour productivity could indicate a lower level of 
vigilance of the various fields in the order processing screens.  A 
counter argument to the above would be that the prescribers were 
becoming more familiar with the system and making fewer mistakes 
on order entry.  This cannot be resolved with the data at hand, but the 
data is available and can be used with IRB approval.  The results from 
this study can be used in a submission to IRB as justification for 
access to the data. 
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Study Design 
A before and after-after (pre-post) or interrupted time series 
study was selected as the most viable methodology for this research.  
Both the redesign and relocation of the outpatient pharmacy and the 
posting of the productivity reports were known events (interventions).  
The date the changes were made is fixed and the intervention 
occurred once for the relocation.  While the workload reports are 
posted each month, since October 2010 there has been no change in 
their design.  The effect will only be measured for those individuals 
who were assigned to the outpatient pharmacy for at least fourteen 
months before and after the pharmacy relocation and six months 
before and after the posting of the new workload report. 
One of the criticisms of such an approach is the lack of a 
concurrent control group.97  While this is a valid criticism, there are 
advantages to using such an approach, especially if precautions are 
taken to avoid some of the pitfalls associated with this kind of study.  
Care has to be taken to avoid the “post hoc propter hoc” (“After this 
therefore because of this”) logic fault, i.e. something that occurred 
first therefore caused something that follows.  For example if the 
pharmacy is relocated and redesigned and pharmacist productivity 
increases after the move, the increase in productivity can be attributed 
to the move and only the move. 
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One of the first concerns is the existence of any temporal trends.  
Are the cyclical or time related changes in the environment that would 
have an impact on individual workflow?  For example, where there any 
trends in individual productivity that existed prior to the intervention 
and would these trends “dampen” out the intervention's effect?  This 
objection can be countered by subjecting the productivity data to 
regression analysis to determine the existence of any trends prior to 
the intervention.   
Another concern would be is the study group representative of 
the population being studied?  In this case the study group is 
restricted to those pharmacists who are responsible for finishing 
prescriptions in the outpatient pharmacy.  This can be confirmed by 
reviewing their production as a percentage of total outpatient 
prescriptions processed.  The individuals in the post intervention group 
will be limited to the individuals who were assigned to outpatient prior 
to the intervention.  Since pharmacy staff turn-over is very low, the 
study group comprised individuals who process the majority of 
outpatient prescriptions.  
Two of the advantages of a before-after design are its simplicity 
and low cost of data collection.  Another advantage is that since the 
workload database already existed and did not contain patient specific 
information, the data could be obtained with minimal requirements 
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from the Research and Development Committee and Institutional 
Review Board.  This allowed an expeditious review of the data.   
There is concern that the organization’s emphasis on productivity 
may increase the incidence of processing errors, i.e. errors made at 
the time of prescription finishing.  A useful follow up to this study 
would be to determine if any of the interventions had an impact on 
prescription error.  A detailed review is possible using the response to 
order alerts but such a review would require R&D and IRB approval.  
An indicator, which would not require such an approval, would be the 
reported aggregate errors reported for outpatient pharmacy.   
These aggregates only indicate the reported errors per unit time, 
for example reported errors per month.  They are not broken down to 
type, i.e. dispensing versus a verification error or whether or not the 
error was reported as a result of an admission due to a missed drug or 
allergy interaction.  Also it is known that, due to many of the factors 
discussed in Chapter One, such errors are woefully underreported. 
These errors will be tabulated for the interval before and after the 
interventions, however this can only be done as an anecdotal 
observation and no real conclusions can be drawn without more detail. 
One of the major disadvantages is that it is not as powerful as a 
randomized controlled study in determining cause and effect. 98 The 
second part of the study, the impact of posting the outpatient 
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workload statistics, is also subject to the Hawthorne Effect, a portion 
of the improvement could be attributed to the very fact that 
employees knew they were being monitored.99 
The most significant change was made to the area where 
pharmacists finished prescriptions, offices replaced the cubicles and 
there was no through traffic.  It was noted in a previous paper that 
much of the staff disruption in the outpatient pharmacy was internal, 
i.e. other staff as opposed to external, e.g. numerous phone calls.100 
The new pharmacy design eliminated or significantly reduced this type 
of disruption.  The break area was also relocated so there was minimal 
traffic in the area where pharmacists finished prescriptions. 
The outcome indicators are the number of prescriptions finished 
per unit time.  These are further broken into the type and route of the 
prescription, both of which would have an impact on processing time.  
The posted report is summarized by month.  This study spans such a 
long interval (37 months) that the impact of vacation time must be 
considered when evaluating the data.  Federal vacation is determined 
by years of service.  Employees working less than five years earn four 
hours per pay period (104 hours per year), five years to less than 
fifteen earn 160 hours per year and those with fifteen or more years of 
experience earn 8 hours per pay period or 208 hours per year.  In 
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addition all federal employees earn 4 hours of sick leave per pay 
period (104 hours per year) and have 10 paid federal holidays. 
The breakdown on service time and available paid time off for 
the individuals involved with the study in included as Table 3.2.  The 
median length of service for the study pharmacists was eight years, 
with the shortest length of service being 2.3 years and the longest 
being over 24 years. This equates to over 5,400 hours of vacation and 
holiday hours which can be accrued per year, or more than 16,000 
hours of vacation or holiday time which could have been used during 
the more than 3 years of the study period.  
Table 3.2 Length of Service 
Years of 
Service 
 
# of staff 
Vacation 
(Hrs) Holiday (Hrs) 
Total Hrs per 
year 
Less than 5  4  832  320  1,152 
5 to < 15  12  1,920  960  2,880 
15 or more  5  1,040  400  1,440 
 
This is close to eight man-years of non-work time by the 
pharmacists included in the study, and these time estimates do not 
include possible use of sick leave.  As a result, in addition to the 
monitor that is actually used, the prescriptions filled per month, a 
better indicator for this study would be to utilize the granularity of the 
data, i.e. time is trapped down to the second, and use prescriptions 
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filled per hours worked during the calendar month for each pharmacist 
in the study. 
In light of the foregoing, it was determined that using 
prescriptions filled per day or month would not be a true 
representation of an individual’s work.  Pharmacists spend different 
amount of time each day processing orders and any time taken off 
would be reflected in daily or monthly reports.  As a result, 
prescriptions processed per hour appeared to be a better indicator of a 
pharmacist’s throughput. 
This was calculated by only counting hours in which an order was 
processed.  The total orders processed per day per pharmacist were 
divided by the number of hours each pharmacist was processing 
orders.  This provided an average production rate in prescriptions 
(orders) per hour per day per pharmacist.  The daily average per 
pharmacist was then averaged for the calendar month and reported as 
an average rate per pharmacist per month.  Functions within MS 
Access make this a fairly simple process.  This will eliminate the 
variability seen in the raw data due to individuals using vacation time 
or other time off during the month. 
In addition to the ratio of total prescriptions to hours for the 
calendar month per person, the study will also look at the ratio of new 
and renew to total and mail and window to total, per person, per unit 
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hours worked in each calendar month.  A shift in a pharmacists 
renew/new or mail/window ratios would indicate that the pharmacist 
was using easier prescription types to artificially increase their 
workload numbers.  When the workload data started being publicly 
posted, administration also established minimum workload standards 
based on total prescriptions processed per calendar month.   The new 
and renewed prescriptions are included in the workload that is posted, 
but the mail/window are not. If results from this research indicate that 
it is a factor, than future charts will include this data. 
As mentioned previously, the pending workload queue for the 
outpatient pharmacy consistently is between one and three thousand 
prescriptions on any given day.  This is usually lower on Mondays and 
gradually increases during the week.   The outpatient pharmacy is 
operational on weekends but new orders tend to be lower, so that 
pharmacy staff uses that time to reduce the pending orders. 
The outpatient pharmacy is always behind, i.e. there is no slack 
in the system, and so it can be assumed that any changes in per 
person productivity are due strictly to changes in performance.  In 
order to meet increased production needs, for example on major 
holidays such as Christmas, individuals from the clinical section 
supplement the outpatient pharmacy staff.  The clinical staff are less 
proficient in finishing physicians’ orders into prescriptions and, as a 
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result, have less throughput per hour than the staff assigned to out-
patient. 
A review of any changes in total outpatient pharmacy production 
will include growth trends over the three years of the study.   These 
will indicate why methods to increase throughput and performance are 
essential.  The organization is currently in a hiring freeze, so the only 
way to meet increased demand is to increase individual productivity. 
Analytical Methods and Tools 
The relocation of the pharmacy took place during the second 
weekend in June 2009. Data was collected through April 2011 with the 
posting of the Outpatient Workload reports occurring in October 2010.  
It is presumed that the impact of workflow due to the relocation would 
have stabilized within a few months of the move.  
The total workload will be reviewed and trends over the last 
three years will be measured.  The same indicators for the pharmacists 
being reviewed with be gathered and the percent of total workload for 
these pharmacists will be calculated.  
MS Access 2007 will be used to store and extract data from the 
Pharmacy Workload Database and MS Excel 2007 and SAS Software 
9.2 will be used to analyze the data.  Pursuant to VA requirements, for 
data storage, which applies even to data that does not contain patient 
sensitive information, the working extract will be stored on a secure 
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folder on the Principal Investigators workspace on the organization 
internal network located behind the VA Firewall. 
Workload per hour worked will be calculated for each outpatient 
pharmacist used in the study for the 14 months before the move and 
14 months after the move/relocation, excluding June 2009 the month 
of the move.  For the workload reporting, data will be collected for six 
months before and six months after the posting excluding October 
2010, the month data was first posted. 
This results in four test groups.  Group 1 is data collected from 
April 1, 2008 through to May 31, 2009.  Group 2 is the post move data 
and includes data from July 1, 2009 through August 31, 2010.  Group 
3 is the pre-reporting group and includes data from April 1, 2010 
through September 30, 2010.  Group 4 is the data from November 1, 
2010 through April 30, 2011. 
Table 3.3  Data Collection Time Line 
 
 
Table 3.3 represents the time line over which the data was 
collected.  While there were over-laps between the pre-posting and 
after move intervals the effect of this overlap would be moot.  The 
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changes in the operating characteristics induced by the move were 
irreversible and would still exist for both groups 3 and 4. The end of 
the data collection post move was simply to keep the design balanced.  
Group 3 is prior to the posting of the workload data, i.e. no 
intervention has occurred.  Groups 3 and 4 are both equally affected 
by the intervention in June, 2009. 
The same individuals were involved with all four groups so 
Student’s Paired T will be used to determine if there is any difference 
between groups.  The hypothesis being tested are quite simply: 
H0:  µGroup 1- µGroup 2 = 0 
Ha:   µGroup 1- µGroup 2 ≠0 
H0:  µGroup 3 - µGroup 4 = 0 
Ha:   µGroup 3 - µGroup 4 ≠0 
The reported errors rates will be evaluated pre and post 
intervention.  This data will simply be reported as an anecdote; it will 
have to be aggregated with no identifiers; as a result there is limited 
usability in the reports.  It is well established that medication errors 
are woefully under-reported so that simply reviewing published 
aggregate data will not provide much specificity.  A further study is 
planned, requesting IRB approval to match order checks, alerts and 
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over-rides to the prescription processing but that is beyond the scope 
of this research. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
RESULTS 
 
Overall Characteristics  
The dataset had already been de-identified so that work 
schedules could not be used to determine who had been assigned to 
process outpatient orders during the interval April 1, 2008 through 
April 30, 2011.  To determine which records to keep, the average 
output per pharmacist per month was used to determine who was 
primarily assigned to process outpatient orders.  A pharmacist was 
considered to be primarily assigned to outpatient if they consistently 
processed more than 100 orders per month for at least 35 months of 
the 37 month data collection period.  One notable exception was 
found.  A pharmacist had no entries for the first nine months of the 
study but significantly high production numbers thereafter.  The 
records for this person were included in the study group.  The records 
for these pharmacists were then extracted from temporary file on the 
hospital system to the research database which was located on a 
secure server inside the facility’s firewall but separate from the 
facility’s data store. 
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This resulted in 1,507,530 data points for the entire interval.  It 
was anticipated that the actual move of the pharmacy would be 
disruptive so the data for the month of the move, June, 2009 was 
excluded from the study.  The month that the workload reports were 
first posted was also removed. After removing the data for June 2009 
and October 2010, there were 1,422,711 data points.  The study was 
limited to twenty-one pharmacists who were identified by the above 
method.  All but one of them worked in the outpatient pharmacy for 
the entire 37-month interval. There were two other pharmacists who 
did not process orders during a one month period during the study 
interval.  The one pharmacist who was not present for the entire 
interval started having records appear in January 2009, six months 
before the move, and was still working in outpatient at the end of the 
study period.  
The data was first aggregated by using MS Access to count the 
number of orders processed per hour spent finishing orders per 
pharmacist.  These results were then further aggregated into hours 
spent per calendar day and number of orders processed for each hour.  
The average number of orders processed per hour per day for each 
day the pharmacist had reported hours spent finishing prescriptions 
was then averaged per calendar month for all of the months of the 
study. 
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A summary of the total output of the outpatient pharmacy for all 
of the prescriptions filled by the study individuals as compared to the 
total outpatient production for the same interval is included as 
Appendix D.  The percentage of all prescriptions filled by the study 
pharmacists ranged from 59 % to 83% with an average of 71%.  The 
number of hours spent finishing orders, per person per day, was highly 
variable.   This was due to several factors.  For example, requesting 
leave for part of a day or being temporarily assigned to other duties 
that did not involve finishing prescriptions.  In addition, some of the 
pharmacists may have had missing data for a month or more.   This 
could be attributed to the use of extended vacation, or medical care 
leave, for example as in the case of pregnancy or family care leave or 
a temporary reassignment to other areas of the pharmacy.  Figure 4.1 
is a plot of total hours spent finishing prescriptions per month by the 
study pharmacists.  The total number of hours per month was highly 
variable, with a minimum of 312.0, a maximum of 414.7 and a mean 
of 367.7.  As mentioned previously, the total available hours for the 
study pharmacists will vary due to vacation time, sick leave and other 
duty assignments.  It is for this reason it was determined that 
prescriptions processed per hour is a better tool for measuring 
productivity.  The total hours per day finishing prescriptions was 
determined by counting the number of hours each day for any hour in 
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which a pharmacist processed an order into a prescription.  Any hour 
in which the pharmacist did not process at least one prescription would 
not be included in this summary. Conversely, even filling one 
prescription would include that hour in the summary. For example a 
pharmacist who normally works from 8:00AM to 4:30 PM, an 8-hour 
day would be credited for 9 hours if they filled a prescription at 7:59 
AM.  Conversely, a pharmacist who worked the same 8 hour day, but 
only had order processing activity for a portion of the day would only 
have that time spent processing prescriptions include in the total. The 
typical study pharmacist spent between 54% and 78% (average 67%) 
of their working day finishing prescriptions.  While they did not spend 
their entire workday finishing prescriptions, they did fill, on average 
71% of all prescriptions finished by the outpatient pharmacy.  
Figure 4.1 Total Hrs/Month Finishing Rx's  
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A plot of the percentage of prescriptions finished by the study 
pharmacists as compared to the total finished by all pharmacists 
working in the outpatient pharmacy is included as Figure 4.2. A graph 
of the total of all finished orders processed by the outpatient 
pharmacy, by month can be seen in Figure 4.3.  This would indicate 
that the decrease in percentage of the total production by the study 
pharmacists might be the result of the total increase in workload. 
 
In order to standardize the data it was necessary to consider the 
hours a pharmacist spent, per day, finishing prescriptions and the 
number of prescriptions finished in that interval.    This was 
determined using data management software (MS Access 2007).  The 
data element for the date included date and time. The data was 
grouped by the person ID, then by the date, then by the hour of the 
Figure 4.2 Percent Rxs Finished by Study RPhs  
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day for which prescription were finished.  The number of prescriptions 
processed for each hour was counted.  Then two summary queries 
were written, counting the number of hours during which prescriptions 
were finished and the sum of the prescriptions processed for all hours 
that day.  
 
A second query then averaged the production rate per day by 
pharmacist to determine an average prescriptions/hr production rate 
for each pharmacist for each month of the study.  The number of 
prescriptions per hour is the outcome measure that was used to 
determine the effectiveness of the two “treatments”, i.e. the pharmacy 
Redesign/relocation and the posting of workload statistics. 
Figure 4.3 Total RXs Finished, All RPh  
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As can be seen in Figure 4.4, the total production over the entire 
period was variable, with a range of approximately 16 to 21, (average 
of approximately 18) prescriptions per hour spent finishing 
prescriptions.   A linear trend line is superimposed in the data. 
The average overall productivity over the entire study period, in 
prescriptions per hour, for each of the study pharmacists is included in 
Appendix E.  When the data is examined per person/per month there 
is an apparent trend which will be discussed further in the sections 
below. 
 
As mentioned previously, the pending orders to be processed are 
in the range of two to three thousand.  The system has no slack so 
that any changes in productivity are due to changes in the processing 
Figure 4.4 Average Prescriptions Finished Per Hour Study 
RPhs  
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capability of the outpatient pharmacists.  The first outcome to be 
measured was the average productivity of all the study pharmacists 
before and after the pharmacy relocation. 
While the data was granular to the point of minute the order was 
processed, it was decided to use the average hourly production rate 
per person per month. A daily average could have been used but there 
was a great deal variability in the daily production.  Part of the 
difficulty in using a daily average was the fact that on any given day 
an outpatient pharmacist may spend anywhere from one hour to ten 
hours processing prescriptions.  This depended on where the 
pharmacist was assigned on a particular day.  Over the course of a 
month, the pharmacists’ productivity “averaged” out.  It must be 
remembered that the pharmacists included in the study processed 
most of the outpatient orders. 
Reported Errors 
Figure 4.5 is a plot of all outpatient pharmacy orders 
discontinued for cause during the study period.  There is an apparent 
decrease in discontinued orders per month. Orders are discontinued 
during processing for a number or reasons, from simple adjustments 
to a dosage form to discontinuing the order due to a drug interaction 
or serious allergy to the drug.  While the actual number of orders 
discontinued during processing significantly decreased, a decrease in 
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pharmacist attentiveness is only one explanation.  Physicians could be 
more familiar with the system, over time, and therefore entering fewer 
orders that needed adjustment or discontinuation during order 
processing.  Also the system generated order alerts could be acted 
upon by the provider, again eliminating the need for the pharmacist to 
take further action. 
Another indicator of error is the CMOP reject rate for cause.  
Figure 4.6 is a graph of the CMOP rejects for errors in the prescription 
and does not include rejects for reasons such as “CMOP out of stock” 
or “drug on backorder”.  This data is only available back to December 
of 2009.  There was a decrease of over 500 rejects between December 
Figure 4.5 Total DC'd Orders OP Pharm 
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2009 and January 2010.  This cannot be explained by the data at 
hand. 
There is also an apparent decrease in reported rejects between 
October 2010 and February 2011.  Again, the reason for this decrease 
cannot be easily explained.  A further discussion of this effect, in 
relation to the posting of the pharmacy workload data will be discussed 
in Chapter 5. 
 
Figure 4.6 CMOP Error Rejects  
 
Pharmacy Relocation 
The data for the study pharmacists was aggregated by month for 
the interval April 1, 2008 through August 30, 2010.  Data for the 
month of June 2009, the month of the move, was excluded.  This 
resulted in 578 observations.  588 would have been expected; data for 
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21 pharmacists over 28 months.  The one pharmacist who did not start 
until January 1, 2009 accounts for nine of these “missing” 
observations.  One pharmacist did not process any orders in July 2008 
and would account for the other missing observation.   This is another 
reason why average production per hour, for hours spent processing 
orders was used as the outcomes measure.   
Table 4.1 Production data by Group, Groups 1 and 2 
 
Group Hours RX RX/Hr 
1 28,773  563,679  19.59 
2 31,338  561,852  17.92 
2-1 2,565  -1,827  -1.67 
 
The data in Table 4.1 is production data for group 1, 14 months 
prior to the Redesign/relocation and group 2, which is the 14 months 
after the Redesign/relocation, excluding the month of the move.  It 
should be noted that while the number of hours spent processing 
orders by the study pharmacists increased, the actual number of 
orders processed decreased, which resulted in a reduction in total 
output in RX/Hr. 
While the duties assigned to the pharmacists were supposed to 
be the same for all study pharmacists, as can be seen from the tables 
in Appendix F and Appendix G,  there was a lot of variability among 
the pharmacists both pre and post relocation and  redesign of the 
pharmacy.  Fourteen of the study pharmacists had a decrease in 
 102 
processing orders, averaging 4.1 prescriptions per hour.  The 
remaining seven had an increase in production averaging 2.2 
prescriptions per hour. Total orders processed over the study interval 
decreased by over 1,800 prescriptions after the redesign/relocation of 
the outpatient pharmacy.  During the same period the time spent 
processing orders increased by over 2,500 hours with the net result of 
a decrease of over 41 orders processed per hour for the study group.  
The change in productivity per study pharmacist before and after the 
move is included in Appendix H.  Appendices J and K include the 
changes in productivity before and after the posting of workload data. 
The data for the Redesign/Relocation was coded as Group 1 for 
the 14 month period prior to the move and Group 2 for the 14 months 
following the move, excluding June 2009, the actual month of the 
move.  SAS paired sample analysis was used to evaluate the 
production rate per hour for the study pharmacists.   The mean 
production rate for groups 1 and 2 is included in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 Paired Sample Statistics Groups 1 and 2 
Group N Mean (S.D.) Std Error of Mean 
1 21 19.10 (12.0) 2.63 
2 21 17.11 (11.2) 2.44 
 
A summary of the paired samples statistics for Groups 1 and 2 is 
included in Table 4.3.  There was a mean difference (p-value = 0.028) 
between the two groups of two prescriptions per hour. 
 103 
Table 4.3 Paired Samples Test Groups 1 and 2 
 
Mean (S.D.) 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
   
Degrees 
of 
Freedom 
Test 
Statistic 
P-Value 
(2 Tailed) 
1 -2 1.997 (3.870) 0.844 20 2.365 0.028 
 
Posting Productivity Data 
The data for the first month that Pharmacist Productivity was 
publically posted, October 2010, was excluded from the analysis.  This 
resulted in 251 observations for the interval; 252 would have been 
expected. A pharmacist did not have any hours for processing orders 
during the study interval, which accounts for the missing observation.   
Nine of the study pharmacists (42.8%) had an average decrease 
of 2.3 prescriptions per hour per pharmacist while the remaining 
twelve had an average increase of 2.8 prescriptions per hour. 
Table 4.4 examines the productivity of the study pharmacists for 
Group 3, six months prior to posting productivity data and Group 4, six 
months after posting such data.  The month in which the report was 
first posted is excluded from the analysis.  As with the previous groups 
there were significant differences in per pharmacist productivity.   
Table 4.4 Production Data by Group, Groups 3 and 4 
Group Hours RX RX/Hr 
3  13,537  244,390  18.1 
4  13,758  261,352  19.0 
4-3  221  16,962  0.90 
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There was a very slight increase in reported productivity in 
Group 4, the effect after the intervention.  The basic statistics for each 
group is included in Table 4.5 
Table 4.5 Paired Samples Statistics Groups 3 and 4 
Group N Mean (S.D.) Std. Error Mean 
3  21  17.33 (10.23)  2.23 
4  21  17.92 (8.85)  1.93 
 
The results of the comparison are included in Table 4.6.  There 
was no statistical significance in the results between Groups 3 and 4 
(p-value= 0.546) which indicated that the posting of the workload 
data had no effect on pharmacists productivity. 
Table 4.6 Paired Samples Test Groups 3 and 4 
Group Mean (S.D.) 
Std 
Error of 
Mean 
Degrees 
of 
Freedom 
Test 
Statistic 
P-Value 
(2 Tailed) 
3-4 -0.59 (4.365) 0.95 20 -0.615 0.546 
 
As with Group 1 and Group 2 there was an observed high 
variability among the pharmacists.  A comparison of the differences in 
pharmacist response to both interventions is included in Appendix L. 
Chapter Summary 
The conclusions for the original hypotheses are included in 
Tablet 4.7.  The Redesign/relocation appeared to have a negative 
effect on productivity with a net loss of 2.0 prescriptions per hour (p-
value = 0.028), while the posting of production data had no significant 
effect (p-value=0.546). 
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Table 4.7 Summary of Hypothesis Testing 
H0 The pharmacies Redesign/ relocation had no 
effect on per pharmacist productivity. 
Rejected 
H0 The public posting of pharmacist monthly 
workload data had no effect on productivity. 
Accepted 
 
Since there appeared to be a great deal of variation in 
productivity among the study pharmacists, a repeated measures 
ANOVA was used to examine these differences.  This indicated that 
there was a significant difference (p-value < .0001) between the 
pharmacists over all interventions.  The effects of the pharmacist and 
both treatments are included in Table 4.7.  As can be seen, the overall 
effect of both treatments was not significant, while the pharmacist and 
pharmacist treatment interaction were significant. 
Table 4.8 Repeated Measures ANOVA Both Treatments 
Source DF Type I SS 
Mean 
Square 
F 
Value Pr > F 
Treatment 1 56.46903 56.46903 3.05 0.0823 
Person 20 19949.52994 997.47650 53.86 <0.0001 
Treatment*Person 20 1206.51936 60.32597 3.26 <0.0001 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND 
 
AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
 
Research Summary 
One of the benefits of performing this kind of research is the 
discovery that what the organization presumes to be happening is not 
always the case, theories regarding pharmacists being distracted while 
finishing physicians’ orders as a factor in low productivity were not 
substantiated by the data.  Quite the contrary, there was a statistically 
significant decrease in productivity when the outpatient pharmacy was 
located to a more modern, redesigned facility with minimal 
interruptions to pharmacists finishing orders. 
Posting workload data appeared to have a small positive impact 
on overall productivity however this was not statistically significant.  
One reason for these apparent contradictions to accepted management 
theory may be quite simply that the majority of the pharmacists were 
already working at or beyond the maximum safe production rate.  The 
data for both experiments indicated that productivity was highly 
variable among the pharmacists. 
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Table 5.1 is a summary comparison of the results of the 
relocation redesign and the posting of workload statistics for all of the 
study pharmacists.  The redesign/relocation resulted in a net loss in 
productivity of close to 42 orders per hour for the 21 study 
pharmacists.  The posting of workload data resulted in a net increase 
of over 12 orders per hour for the study pharmacists.  In short, after 
the relocation another 2,500 hours were required to produce 1,800 
fewer prescriptions.  The effect of the posting was to produce over 
16,000 additional prescriptions with only 221 additional hours.  
Unfortunately when looking at the per pharmacist comparison, 
(Appendix L) it was clear that the effect was more related to the 
pharmacist then either the move or the posting of workload data. 
Table 5.1 Comparison Redesign and Posting of Data 
 HRS Rx Rx/Hr 
Redesign  2,565 -1,827  -41.9 
Posting  221 16,962  12.3 
 
A summary of the Paired Tests for the two pairs, group 1-2, and 
group 3-4 is included as Table 5.2.  In addition to these summaries, a 
review of the pharmacist contributions to these results is included at 
Table 5.3.  The response of the pharmacists to the treatments was 
highly variable.  It is interesting to note that six of the pharmacists 
had decreases in productivity after both treatments and six had 
increases in productivity after each treatment. 
 108 
Table 5.2 Pharmacist Responses to Treatment 
 
Change in 
productivity 
Treatment 
Number of 
Pharmacists Percent Total Avg Std 
Move 
14 66.7 -4.22  3.16 
7 33.3  2.18 1.18 
Posting 
9 42.9  -2.40  2.94 
12 57.1  3.27  3.67 
 
Effect of the Redesign/Relocation 
The effect of the Redesign/relocation was statistically significant 
with an average decrease in productivity of two prescriptions per hour 
per person.  Over 2,500 additional hours resulted in the production of 
1,800 fewer prescriptions.  There was a significant difference in how 
individual study pharmacists reacted to the change.  Fourteen of the 
twenty-one study pharmacists (66.6%) had a decrease in productivity, 
while the remaining seven pharmacists increased their productivity.  
The increased productivity by these seven pharmacists was dwarfed by 
the reduction in productivity by the other fourteen. 
Table 5.3 Paired Samples Test Summaries 
Group 
Paired Differences 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Mean 
   
DF T 
Sig 
(2 Tailed) 
1 -2 1.997 3.870 0.844 20 2.365 0.028 
3-4 -.059 4.365 0.950 20 -0.615 0.546 
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The reduction, or at least no increase in productivity, after the 
pharmacists moved to “the palace”, as the area was referred to by one 
pharmacy supervisor, was a concern of pharmacy administration even 
before this study was conducted.  It was this concern for productivity 
which led to the development of the monthly reports which were 
provided to pharmacy management.  It was when these reports 
seemed to indicate that there was no increase in productivity, even 
after the move, that management decided it may be worthwhile to let 
the staff know that their output was being monitored and the posting 
of the workloads began in October 2010.  This was fifteen months 
after the relocation of the outpatient pharmacy.   
There are several plausible explanations for this decrease.   In 
addition to providing a quieter environment, the new outpatient work 
area was divided into four compartmentalized areas separated by solid 
doors.  In the old environment the pharmacists processing orders 
worked in cubicles in the same open workspace where the supervisors 
were constantly moving about, working with technicians, supervising 
vault technicians and helping out where there were difficulties.  While 
there was one office for both supervisors, they were seldom in their 
office. 
In the new environment, the supervisors tend to stay in their 
own individual offices.  While they do make “rounds” of the area, they 
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are neither as visible nor as available as in the old environment.  This 
would allow pharmacists processing orders to have “down time” when 
they were not actively processing orders, for example using the 
computer system to “surf the internet”.  The current productivity 
reports, as seen by the staff are a monthly summary.  The supervisors 
are provided with a detailed report, by person and day. The report 
simply indicates how many prescriptions a pharmacist filled that 
working day.  The fact that a pharmacist fills their quota, currently 120 
prescriptions,  there is no indication to the supervisors as to whether 
the person kept a consistent pace throughout the day or filled their 
quota early and the slowed down the remainder of the day.  The 
pharmacists are aware that the report given to the supervisors is a 
summary of total output by day.  That particular problem was 
addressed by using the workload per processing hour for the study.  
While this still leaves open the possibility that the pharmacist could 
have slack time during each work hour, the data is more robust than 
work units per day.   
In order to close this particular gap in workload reporting, the 
pharmacy service data manager is going to redesign the extract report 
to include the minutes between finish date/time per work hour per 
pharmacist as another field in the extract.  The workload reports are 
not official VA reports and there is no standard workload reporting tool 
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in the system. This is fortunate in that it gives the facility the ability to 
design the reports and then Redesign them as needed. 
The time between finishing prescriptions per processing hour per 
pharmacist can be used to determine the actual mean time between 
processing prescriptions.  A fairly lengthy time between processing, for 
example 15 minutes, would indicate break periods.  Supervisors could 
review the output of pharmacists who consistently had such long 
breaks over multiple periods. 
While this will provide some conclusive data as to whether or not 
pharmacists are taking advantage of slack time due to lack of 
supervision it is doubtful that this is the cause for the apparent 
decrease in productivity.  In order to achieve the averages found in 
this study the pharmacist would have to finish one prescription every 
3.3 minutes.  It can be done in less time and two pharmacists had 
been able to fill one prescription approximately every one and a half 
minutes.    
Yet another possibility for the apparent decrease in productivity 
had to do with the use of clinical staff to supplement the outpatient 
staff when pending prescriptions exceeded 3,000 prescriptions.  
Pharmacy administration was well aware that the clinical staff would 
not be as efficient and it was decided to find a way for them to process 
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the less problematic prescriptions, those that required less knowledge 
of the outpatient system to process. 
While all new orders have to be reviewed by a pharmacist, there 
are two types of new order, new and renewed prescriptions.  Renewed 
prescriptions are simply copies of previous orders, which are carried 
forward by the prescriber.  They still trigger alerts but these alerts 
have usually already been dealt with when the drugs or condition, e.g. 
an allergy, was first entered.  They must be reviewed by a pharmacist 
but the review is more cursory that would be required for a real “new” 
order.  
The normal process for completing orders is to use the 
“complete orders” option in the computer.  This is a first in, first out 
system whereby the pharmacist cycles through all pending orders in 
the sequence in which they were entered.  The easy, “renewed” orders 
are mixed in with the regular orders. 
In order to facilitate prescription processing by clinical staff the 
pharmacy data manager wrote a report which would allow printing of 
the “renewed” orders only.  The report was designed to include those 
data elements of an order which would allow a clinical staff member to 
rapidly access the patient record with the “renewed” prescription.  If 
the clinical staff processed more of the “renewed” orders this would 
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leave the more difficult orders for processing by the outpatient staff, 
which would tend to slow them down. 
Prior to the move of the outpatient pharmacy the service had 
been using overtime for outpatient staff to keep the pending order 
queue from getting to excessive.  In October of 2009 overtime hours 
were severely cut and it was at this point that clinical staff began to be 
used to supplement outpatient staff.  They were assigned a menu 
option allowing them to print a report of the pending orders and they 
used that to select the pending renew orders for processing.  This 
should have reduced the number of renewed orders available to the 
outpatient staff with the result that they were left with a higher 
number of new orders which take longer to process.  This could also 
explain the sharp decrease in production of the pharmacists who were 
processing a very large number of orders; in the past they may have 
been provided with copies of the pending renew orders by the 
outpatient supervisor, who also had access to the menu option created 
by the pharmacy data manager.  When these orders were no longer 
available, having been filled by the clinical staff, these pharmacists 
would have been left with a higher proportion of new orders. 
Unfortunately there is no field in the prescription record 
indicating whether an order is the result of a renew action.  There is 
such an entry in the actual order, and the prescription number for all 
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prescriptions which are the result of a renew order contain a letter 
suffix, A though Z.  The report written for pharmacy management 
made use of this fact and used a simple query to determine if the right 
most character of the prescription number contained a character entry, 
ASCII > 64 and < 91;  the legacy system only uses upper case letters.  
The pharmacy management database included a logical field (RENEW) 
populated by the examination of the prescription number. It was this 
logical variable which was used in the research extract. 
While the supposition that clinical staff, and a select few 
outpatient staff, used copies of the pending prescription report so that 
fewer renewed orders were available to the remaining outpatient 
pharmacists has merit, it is not supported by the data. As can be seen 
in Figure 5.1 the rate of renewed orders processed by study 
pharmacists had a slight upward trend over the study period. 
Before assuming that pharmacists were cutting back on their 
work due to their ability to relax a bit behind closed doors or clinical 
staff members were taking all of the “easy” orders, another 
explanation for the slight decrease in productivity has to be examined 
as well.  This would be the possibility that the pharmacists may 
already be producing at close to peak capacity and are now becoming 
demotivated.  This particular aspect will be discussed further below. 
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Figure 5.1 Percent Renew Study Pharmacist 
Effect of Posting Workload Data 
When the individual data was reviewed for effects due to posting 
workload data, it was obvious that one of the pharmacists had a 
significant decrease in productivity.  It is presumed that the person 
noticed they were processing orders at a rate well above the mean and 
decreased the rate somewhat, trending toward the “average” 
production rate.  It was not, but probably should have been, 
anticipated that posting prescription workload data would have a 
significant negative impact on individuals working well above the 
mean. 
Another possible explanation for the decrease in productivity 
may be due to the fact that since the pharmacists were having fewer 
interruptions they were paying more attention to the order checks and 
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alerts.  A though review of these alerts would add to the to the 
prescription processing time, thereby decreasing prescription 
throughput.  Since the data is available in the system, a future study is 
planned that will expand on the current research and evaluate how the 
pharmacists responded to the order checks. 
A simple application of Adam’s equity theory probably should 
have predicted this outcome.  Adam’s definition for inequity: 
Inequity exists for Person whenever he perceives that the 
ratio of his outcomes to inputs and the ratio of Other’s 
outcomes to inputs are unequal.  This may happen either 
(a) when he and Other are in a direct exchange 
relationship or (b) when both are in an exchange 
relationship with a third party and Person compares 
himself to Other.101 
 
The pharmacist in question was performing at a rate of over 52 
prescriptions per worked hour prior to the posting of the workload 
dada and was still performing high about the average, 41 prescriptions 
per hour, after the posting of the data.   There was no reward for 
processing more prescriptions than the norm and increased exposure 
to making an error.  While the postings are de-identified, each 
individual knows their own ID code.  In the absence of a reward and 
the risk associated with a dispensing error, it should have been 
predicted that an individual would decrease their productivity once 
they saw how they were performing relative to the group as a whole. 
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Effect on Error 
As noted in Chapter Four, there was a significant decrease in the 
orders discontinued during processing.  Orders discontinued by a 
pharmacist during processing could be considered an indicator of how 
attentive the pharmacist was while processing that particular order.  
There was no IRB approval to obtain patient sensitive information so 
that only global error indicators could be obtained.   Unfortunately 
without the IRB approval to look at order alerts for all orders 
processed, which would require access to patient sensitive information, 
only the total discontinued orders can be included.  This request is 
pending for future research. 
A resolution to this issue can be had by using the order check 
data to determine the response of the prescriber and pharmacist to 
the order checks. A comparison of response over time could be used to 
determine whether the physicians were discontinuing orders with 
alerts prior to processing by the service, or if the pharmacists were 
taking fewer actions on the same kinds of orders checks on which 
actions had been taken in the past. 
Observations on Pharmacy Work Design 
It is interesting to note that when examining changes in order 
processing per hour for both interventions, seven of the study 
pharmacists had a decrease in productivity after each intervention, i.e. 
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seven of the pharmacists who had a decrease after the relocation also 
had a decrease after the posting of workload data.  These differences 
were significant. 
While there have been retirements and termination due to 
medical events, there has been no turn-over in pharmacists, where an 
individual has left for other employment, in the last three years.  The 
reasons for this are due to the poor job prospects for pharmacists in 
the Tampa Bay Area.  The job index score for the entire state of 
Florida hovers around 3 and has been below that for several months in 
early 2011.102  It must be remembered that 3 means that the 
employer to employee ratio is balanced; changing jobs would be 
difficult.  Below 3 indicates a slight over-supply of pharmacists; 
changing jobs may be impossible. 
As a result, even if pharmacists were dissatisfied with their work 
environment, the chances of them finding other employment would be 
difficult.  This could result in issues with motivation and a resultant 
loss of productivity.  The fact that seven (1/3) of the study pharmacist 
had decreases in productivity after both interventions would indicate 
that there could possibly be other factors affecting production.   
Relevance to Researchers 
There is little work on prescription throughput as measured in 
prescriptions per hour.  The traditional measure of outpatient 
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productivity is the number of prescriptions filled per day by each 
pharmacist.  The hours worked by each pharmacist are not usually 
considered and the workload reported as an aggregate number of 
prescriptions filled that working day. 
This research examined a variety of reporting systems, including 
prescriptions per working day per person and prescriptions per 
working month per person.  When it is necessary to evaluate work 
throughput and cognition, workload per hour may be a more reliable 
indicator and more readily tied to the effects of fatigue.  Research can 
examine hour numbers to see if there is any correlation between high 
numbers of prescriptions throughput at the end a working day and a 
reductions in positive actions to system alerts. 
Relevance to the Profession  
Current models for staffing include determining the number of 
staff pharmacists based on an arbitrarily assigned prescription load per 
year, “X” prescriptions per year equate to “Y” pharmacists where “X” 
and “Y” are determined by the organization.  In many cases these 
models are not true models but rather estimates made by an 
organization’s upper management.   
While this particular research cannot answer as to what is an 
optimum processing rate for safety; it does provide a basis for further 
research in this area.  Logic dictates that the prescription fill rate is not 
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infinite and there must be a number which would be optimum, 
balancing high production rates with the ability to appropriately deal 
with the growing number of alerts for drug/drug interactions or 
allergies. 
The prescription per hour measure also allows supervisors to 
evaluate the performance of individuals without having to try and tie 
workload measures to schedules.  There are a number of reasons a 
daily report can be misleading.  The pharmacist may have had to be 
temporarily assigned to other duties, may have had a doctor’s 
appointment or for any other reason was not able to work their full 
shift.  Order processing rate per hour, averaged over a working month, 
would dampen out these effects. 
Job Characteristics  
This research focused on the physical design associated with 
production and the motivational effect of posting workload data and 
did not consider any of the job characteristics models established by 
Hackman, Oldham, Parker and others.  The fact that six pharmacists 
had declines in productivity after both interventions and six 
pharmacists has increases in productivity after both interventions 
implies that a major factor in the productivity may not be so much the 
physical environment bur rather motivation of the staff. 
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The organization has been increasingly moving toward 
management by directive from the Central Office as well as the local 
regional office. The end result was that the pharmacists were 
constrained in what they could do and had to ensure that they were 
performing to achieve VISN and National outcomes indicators.  For 
example, rather than focus on total drug cost per patient, individual 
indicators were set up for specific drugs.  The organization could be 
doing very well in controlling overall pharmaceutical costs yet be an 
outlier in one of the indicator costs.  Thus the organization would have 
pressure placed on the pharmacists to improve performance on that 
particular indicator rather than recognizing them for overall high 
performance. 
While the processing of physicians’ orders into prescriptions 
required a great deal of cognitive involvement, the emphasis on both 
productivity and adherence to national use guidelines minimized, at 
least to some extent, the pharmacist’s clinical involvement with 
processing of the prescription. The pharmacist in this case is reduced 
almost to an extension of the system relying on computer prompts and 
referring to guidelines to determine a particular course of action.  It is 
not surprising that a third of the study pharmacists showed declines in 
productivity after both interventions. 
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This particular aspect of pharmacy is not unique to the study 
organization.  The pressures and environment found at the outpatient 
pharmacy is very similar to that in a chain pharmacy. Hardigan and 
Carvajal noted in their review of job satisfaction among different types 
of pharmacy practice: 
It is established in past research that chain pharmacists 
report the lowest levels of job satisfaction. Studies that 
look at various latent predictors of job satisfaction, such 
as job autonomy and workload, show that chain 
pharmacists are the least satisfied.  Research also 
demonstrates that independent pharmacists report the 
highest level of satisfaction and chain pharmacists the 
lowest.103 
 
In general, there should be concern that the “fast and accurate” 
philosophy of what makes a good practicing pharmacist in a high 
volume pharmacy may lead to less attention being paid to drug 
interactions by the pharmacist.  In order to minimize or eliminate 
errors which could result in fatal consequences to the patient, 
corporations must assess how much reliance is being placed on 
automated systems to detect these interactions and other possible 
therapeutic issues with the prescription. 
Limitations of this Research 
Any research conducted outside of a laboratory environment 
encounters some aspects which cannot be controlled as well as the 
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researcher would like.  There were several such issues with this 
research.   
The first major concern was the inability to have direct 
observation of the pharmacists, as was done in the research which led 
to this project.  The old pharmacy design was open; students and 
other staff could be used for indirect observation of the pharmacists’ 
workstations.  It was possible to count the number of interruptions 
while staff thought the reviewer was monitoring the production of the 
pharmacy robot or examining problems with the mail processing 
system.  The person doing the indirect observations has, as his 
primary duties, maintenance of the various pharmacy interfaces and 
was working with both the robotic dispensing system and the mail 
processing system on a fairly regular basis. 
The new pharmacy location does not allow this indirect 
observation.  The production area is far removed from where the 
orders are processed and the staff are well aware when any one from 
the “front office” is in the area.  As a result indirect observation of the 
number and type of interruptions is not possible.  Any place where 
such observations could be made would be very noticeable by the 
staff. 
Another possible issue with the data is the inability to determine 
the actual time spent processing an order.  It can only be 
 124 
approximated by average time to process the order.  For example a 
production rate of 15 prescriptions per hour, would equate to one 
prescription every four minutes.  However it is not known if the 
pharmacist worked rapidly processing orders as fast as possible for the 
first portion of any given hour and then relaxed the remainder of the 
hour.  This is highly unlikely, but cannot be proven or disproven with 
the data at hand. 
Areas for Future Research 
As noted in the Malone paper, there is a presumed correlation 
between the numbers of prescriptions filled per hour and possible 
cognitive errors, for example, ignoring a potential drug interaction or 
patient allergy.  In most studies of ambulatory care pharmacy, the act 
of filling a prescription includes entry of information into the computer, 
selection or verification of the medication in the container, response to 
any system generated alerts and verification that the medication 
container is suitably labeled.  As a result, estimates of a safe workload 
would not correspond well to the processes in place at the organization 
studied.   
On average, the pharmacists at the study facility processed 
orders at a rate close to 18 prescriptions per hour; one order every 3.3 
minutes.  The average rate cited in the Malone paper was 14.1 
prescriptions per hour.  The calculation for the hourly rate in the 
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Malone paper was simply the total number of prescriptions filled 
divided by the total number of pharmacists’ hours available.  This was 
performed in a traditional retail setting where the pharmacist was 
responsible for all of the processing, including checking the final 
container to be given to the patient.  This is significantly different from 
the process at the study facility where the pharmacists processing 
orders are only required to perform the cognitive actions, insuring that 
the order is correct in all details and that any order alerts were 
appropriately addressed.  Distributive functions are handled 
“downstream” and by other individuals.  
However, this leads to other potential problems, most notably 
alarm or alert fatigue and issues with vigilance.  Unlike most out-
patient pharmacy operations, the pharmacists do not usually have to 
enter any data.  The order fields are already populated.  An ideal 
order, one that had been entered perfectly by the prescriber, and 
where the prescriber has appropriately responded to any order checks, 
would require that the pharmacist only have to press enter, accept the 
order, and press enter again. 
As pharmacists continue to process orders there has to be 
concern with vigilance fatigue, especially when the order processing 
rate increases.  At this point there is little data on how many orders 
can safely be processed per hour per pharmacist.  This is of particular 
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concern in an environment where the pharmacist does not necessarily 
have to provide any input into the order but merely has to accept it.   
The Malone paper raises the issue of rate104.  As noted in the literature 
review, various states have recognized that the rate of production may 
be a factor in error and have, in disciplinary actions have limited the 
rate of production to 150 prescriptions per 8 hour day, roughly 19 
prescriptions per hour.  Other than surveys of what pharmacists 
considered to be excessive workload, there does not seem to be any 
hard evidence to support this number. 
There was a lot of variability in pharmacist response to the 
interventions.  While the theories of Pihl and Evans, that dispensing 
errors are due to the inability of some pharmacists to multi-task, it is 
clear that there is a great deal of individual variability in the cognitive 
function of order processing.  The study facility has an abundance of 
data to examine not only production rate per hour per person and, due 
to links to other files, the number of alert over-rides, the nature and 
action taken during the over-ride and whether or not a particular order 
was discontinued by a pharmacist due to the over-ride.  With IRB 
approval it would also be possible to gather demographic data, age 
and gender, for the pharmacists.  This would be an interesting topic 
for future research and would help determine maximum safe 
production rates for prescriptions. 
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There may be no one safe processing rate that would apply to all 
pharmacists and the arbitrary 150 prescription per day limit imposed 
by North Carolina may not be appropriate for all.  Conversely, 
assuming that the rate is dependent only on the working memory of 
the pharmacist does not take into consideration the other factors that 
impact working memory.  It would be interesting to see if some 
characteristics could be identified to allow for the development of a 
safe production rate based on various characteristics of the 
pharmacist, in a manner analogous to the one used by Pihl and Evans. 
In addition, as was previously discussed, one thing this study 
made abundantly clear was that the current workload report is 
inadequate. First, the report which is published for staff is summarized 
by month which grossly distorts the data.  Pharmacists could get a 
false sense of security by looking at only their monthly numbers and 
“front load” their work, working faster, and possible at an unsafe rate, 
early in the day and then slowing down latter in the day. 
The pharmacy data manager has already approached pharmacy 
administration about modifying the report to use monthly average 
production rate per hour spent finishing prescriptions, rather than 
prescriptions per day, as the standard.  In addition, the time between 
finishing prescriptions would be included as a data element and the 
mean time between prescriptions reported.  Supervisors would be 
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provided with a report of any time between finished prescriptions that 
exceeds 10 minutes.  If an individual had multiple events of such 
lengths during a single day, it might merit further review of that 
individual’s work. 
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Appendix A: Old Pharmacy Cubicle Arrangement 
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Appendix B: New Pharmacy Office Arrangement 
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Appendix C: Sample Productivity Report 
 
By Person ID 
R= Renew N= New 
Person Total Total Grand 
ID R N Total 
240786754 257 730  987 
770448557 794 1,731  2,525 
1080504808 0 28  28 
1471659097 1,011 1,668  2,679 
1548686001 844 1,456  2,300 
1608285430 0 67  67 
1701215088 1 9  10 
1709256309 0 49  49 
1748758106 0 28  28 
1807186054 0 2  2 
1807501970 724 1,467  2,191 
2132870282 1,079 1,673  2,752 
Grand Total 4,710 8,908  13,618 
 
  
April 2008 Workload Report 
 144 
 
Appendix D:  New Prescription Production 
 
Study Pharmacists Only Percent 
Period New Renew Total All New 
Apr-08 29,019 14,163 43,182 79.4% 54,352 
May-08 29,663 14,024 43,687 82.6% 52,859 
Jun-08 26,546 10,856 37,402 74.4% 50,252 
Jul-08 25,389 11,015 36,404 68.8% 52,915 
Aug-08 24,334 10,779 35,113 71.4% 49,185 
Sep-08 27,242 12,241 39,483 73.4% 53,815 
Oct-08 27,236 12,616 39,852 71.4% 55,790 
Nov-08 22,537 10,809 33,346 69.1% 48,237 
Dec-08 27,370 13,574 40,944 72.8% 56,226 
Jan-09 29,117 13,755 42,872 77.2% 55,569 
Feb-09 29,416 12,718 42,134 74.8% 56,293 
Mar-09 32,419 14,184 46,603 74.5% 62,527 
Apr-09 30,590 12,758 43,348 68.7% 63,105 
May-09 27,544 11,777 39,321 79.6% 49,383 
Jun-09 29,124 12,520 41,644 72.1% 57,733 
Jul-09 26,150 9,846 35,996 63.1% 57,052 
Aug-09 27,864 13,960 41,824 75.0% 55,800 
Sep-09 25,790 12,313 38,103 66.2% 57,521 
Oct-09 25,808 12,072 37,880 63.4% 59,760 
Nov-09 22,079 9,383 31,462 61.5% 51,167 
Dec-09 26,292 11,580 37,872 63.0% 60,072 
Jan-10 28,714 13,993 42,707 73.1% 58,430 
Feb-10 26,510 11,981 38,491 69.1% 55,694 
Mar-10 32,778 16,196 48,974 73.4% 66,767 
Apr-10 32,225 15,610 47,835 74.2% 64,447 
May-10 28,787 15,398 44,185 71.8% 61,527 
Jun-10 29,496 13,288 42,784 71.6% 59,765 
Jul-10 26,134 11,325 37,459 64.7% 57,932 
Aug-10 24,419 11,884 36,303 59.7% 60,811 
Sep-10 24,545 11,283 35,828 59.7% 60,058 
Oct-10 29,220 13,909 43,129 70.2% 61,480 
Nov-10 27,190 13,836 41,026 70.4% 58,241 
Dec-10 29,012 14,521 43,533 71.1% 61,219 
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Appendix D: (Continued) 
Study Pharmacists Only Percent 
Period New Renew Total All New 
Jan-11 30,783 16,738 47,521 81.1% 58,604 
Feb-11 29,675 14,777 44,452 76.2% 58,356 
Mar-11 30,406 14,449 44,855 67.2% 66,722 
Apr-11 26,689 13,287 39,976 59.2% 67,512 
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Appendix E: Over-All Average Prescription Production per Hour 
per Study Pharmacist 
 
Avg 
PID Hrs_day Rx Rx/Hr 
1 8.2 126 15.3 
2 4.3 44 10.3 
3 7.9 390 49.5 
4 6.5 86 13.3 
5 9.4 113 12.1 
6 3.4 54 15.8 
7 8.9 141 15.8 
8 4.1 38 9.2 
9 4.9 55 11.1 
10 4.9 223 45.7 
11 6.5 92 14.2 
12 9.0 231 25.6 
13 8.8 165 18.7 
14 8.9 88 9.9 
15 7.5 160 21.4 
16 7.2 124 17.2 
17 7.8 96 12.3 
18 8.6 130 15.2 
19 6.2 111 18.0 
20 8.4 109 13.0 
21 5.7 80 14.0 
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Appendix F: Group 1 Productivity per Person 
Person Hours RX RX/Hr 
1 1,917 34,824 18.17 
2 687 8,910 12.97 
3 2,258 112,630 49.88 
4 684 9,377 13.71 
5 1,600 10,003 6.25 
6 250 3,860 15.44 
7 964 14,652 15.20 
8 765 8,340 10.90 
9 1,503 19,871 13.22 
10 1,034 54,683 52.88 
11 493 10,624 21.55 
12 2,253 62,802 27.87 
13 1,979 37,608 19.00 
14 1,764 16,009 9.08 
15 703 19,438 27.65 
16 1,575 21,785 13.83 
17 2,005 23,627 11.78 
18 2,244 41,583 18.53 
19 644 13,007 20.20 
20 2,003 23,446 11.71 
21 1,448 16,600 11.46 
TOTALS: 28,773 563,679 19.59 
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Appendix G: Group 2 Productivity per Person 
Person Hours RX RX/Hr 
1 2,079 29,415 14.15 
2 813 7,201 8.86 
3 2,135 112,581 52.73 
4 891 12,033 13.51 
5 1,762 14,703 8.34 
6 447 6,557 14.67 
7 976 16,294 16.69 
8 1,206 9,919 8.22 
9 1,042 9,206 8.83 
10 1,248 54,412 43.60 
11 823 10,973 13.33 
12 2,043 45,975 22.50 
13 1,760 30,130 17.12 
14 1,727 13,555 7.85 
15 2,169 43,277 19.95 
16 1,505 27,640 18.37 
17 2,124 27,145 12.78 
18 2,079 26,738 12.86 
19 914 17,072 18.68 
20 2,071 26,313 12.71 
21 1,524 20,713 13.59 
TOTALS:  31,338 
 
561,852 17.93 
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Appendix H: Change in Productivity per Person Groups 1 and 2 
Person Hrs RX RX/Hr 
1 162 -5,409 -4.02 
2 126 -1,709 -4.11 
3 -123 -49 2.85 
4 207 2,656 -0.20 
5 162 4,700 2.09 
6 197 2,697 -0.77 
7 12 1,642 1.50 
8 441 1,579 -2.68 
9 -461 -10,665 -4.39 
10 214 -271 -9.29 
11 330 349 -8.22 
12 -210 -16,827 -5.37 
13 -219 -7,478 -1.88 
14 -37 -2,454 -1.23 
15 1,466 23,839 -7.70 
16 -70 5,855 4.53 
17 119 3,518 1.00 
18 -165 -14,845 -5.67 
19 270 4,065 -1.52 
20 68 2,867 1.00 
21 76 4,113 2.13 
TOTALS 2,565 -1,827 -41.94 
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Appendix I:  Group 3 Productivity per Person 
Person Hours RX RX/Hr 
1 864 11,563 13.4 
2 496 5,596 11.3 
3 940 49,376 52.5 
4 312 3,841 12.3 
5 760 9,695 12.8 
6 235 4,289 18.3 
7 468 6,663 14.2 
8 682 6,786 10.0 
9 484 3,862 8.0 
10 410 14,890 36.3 
11 295 2,929 9.9 
12 815 21,754 26.7 
13 734 10,631 14.5 
14 819 9,968 12.2 
15 816 15,741 19.3 
16 651 12,841 19.7 
17 874 11,407 13.1 
18 919 11,849 12.9 
19 363 5,068 14.0 
20 969 14,216 14.7 
21 631 11,425 18.1 
TOTALS: 13,537 244,390 18.1 
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Appendix J: Group 4 Productivity per Person 
 
  
Person Hours RX RX/Hr 
1 911 11,953 13.1 
2 455 3,718 8.2 
3 873 35,833 41.0 
4 394 4,375 11.1 
5 976 24,854 25.5 
6 177 3,148 17.8 
7 398 6,376 16.0 
8 636 5,747 9.0 
9 445 4,753 10.7 
10 563 20,948 37.2 
11 375 3,149 8.4 
12 891 24,766 27.8 
13 851 18,649 21.9 
14 807 11,637 14.4 
15 611 11,657 19.1 
16 732 15,209 20.8 
17 863 11,258 13.0 
18 940 12,613 13.4 
19 342 4,234 12.4 
20 894 14,526 16.2 
21 624 11,949 19.1 
TOTALS: 13,758 261,352 19.0 
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Appendix K: Change in Productivity per Person Group 3 and 4 
Person Hrs RX RX/Hr 
1 47 390 -0.3 
2 -41 -1,878 -3.1 
3 -67 -13,543 -11.5 
4 82 534 -1.2 
5 216 15,159 12.7 
6 -58 -1,141 -0.5 
7 -70 -287 1.8 
8 -46 -1,039 -0.9 
9 -39 891 2.7 
10 153 6,058 0.9 
11 80 220 -1.5 
12 76 3,012 1.1 
13 117 8,018 7.4 
14 -12 1,669 2.2 
15 -205 -4,084 -0.2 
16 81 2,368 1.1 
17 -11 -149 0.0 
18 21 764 0.5 
19 -21 -834 -1.6 
20 -75 310 1.6 
21 -7 524 1.0 
TOTALS: 221 16,962 12.3 
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Appendix L: SCHEFFE’s Test for Rx per Hour 
Alpha 0.05 
Error Degrees of Freedom 703 
Error Mean Square 27.09255 
Critical Value of F 1.58551 
 
Comparisons significant at the 0.5 level are indicated by *** 
Person 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between Means 
Simultaneous 95% 
Confidence 
Limits 
3 - 10 4.680 -2.378 11.738  
3 - 12 23.822 16.816 30.829 ***
3 - 15 29.285 21.696 36.874 ***
3 - 13 31.136 24.130 38.143 ***
3 - 19 31.576 24.519 38.634 ***
3 - 16 32.578 25.571 39.584 ***
3 - 11 33.608 26.602 40.615 ***
3 - 6 33.928 26.922 40.935 ***
3 - 7 33.932 26.926 40.939 ***
3 - 1 34.204 27.198 41.211 ***
3 - 18 34.564 27.557 41.570 ***
3 - 21 35.725 28.719 42.732 ***
3 - 20 36.827 29.821 43.834 ***
3 - 4 36.881 29.875 43.888 ***
3 - 17 37.356 30.350 44.363 ***
3 - 9 38.912 31.906 45.919 ***
3 - 5 39.213 32.206 46.219 ***
3 - 2 39.902 32.895 46.908 ***
3 - 14 40.009 33.002 47.015 ***
3 - 8 40.570 33.563 47.577 ***
10 - 3 -4.680 -11.738 2.378  
10 - 12 19.142 12.084 26.200 ***
10 - 15 24.605 16.969 32.241 ***
10 - 13 26.456 19.398 33.514 ***
10 - 19 26.896 19.788 34.005 ***
10 - 16 27.898 20.840 34.956 ***
10 – 11 28.928 21.870 35.986 ***
10 – 6 29.248 22.190 36.306 ***
10 – 7 29.252 22.194 36.310 ***
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Appendix L: (Continued) 
 
Comparisons significant at the 0.5 level are indicated by *** 
Person 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between Means 
Simultaneous 95% Confidence 
Limits  
10 – 1 29.524 22.466 36.582 *** 
10 – 18 29.883 22.826 36.941 *** 
10 – 21 31.045 23.987 38.103 *** 
10 – 20 32.147 25.089 39.205 *** 
10 – 4 32.201 25.143 39.259 *** 
10 – 17 32.676 25.618 39.734 *** 
10 – 9 34.232 27.174 41.290 *** 
10 – 5 34.533 27.475 41.591 *** 
10 – 2 35.222 28.164 42.280 *** 
10 - 14 35.329 28.271 42.387 *** 
10 - 8 35.890 28.832 42.948 *** 
12 - 3 -23.822 -30.829 -16.816 *** 
12 - 10 -19.142 -26.200 -12.084 *** 
12 - 15 5.463 -2.126 13.052   
12 - 13 7.314 0.307 14.321 *** 
12 - 19 7.754 0.696 14.812 *** 
12 - 16 8.756 1.749 15.762 *** 
12 - 11 9.786 2.779 16.793 *** 
12 - 6 10.106 3.100 17.113 *** 
12 - 7 10.110 3.104 17.117 *** 
12 - 1 10.382 3.376 17.389 *** 
12 - 18 10.741 3.735 17.748 *** 
12 - 21 11.903 4.897 18.910 *** 
12 - 20 13.005 5.999 20.012 *** 
12 - 4 13.059 6.053 20.066 *** 
12 - 17 13.534 6.527 20.541 *** 
12 - 9 15.090 8.084 22.097 *** 
12 - 5 15.391 8.384 22.397 *** 
12 - 2 16.080 9.073 23.086 *** 
12 - 14 16.187 9.180 23.193 *** 
12 - 8 16.748 9.741 23.754 *** 
15 - 3 -29.285 -36.874 -21.696 *** 
15 - 10 -24.605 -32.241 -16.969 *** 
15 - 12 -5.463 -13.052 2.126   
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Appendix L: (Continued) 
 
Comparisons significant at the 0.5 level are indicated by *** 
Person 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between Means 
Simultaneous 95% Confidence 
Limits  
15 - 13 1.851 -5.738 9.440   
15 - 19 2.292 -5.345 9.928   
15 - 16 3.293 -4.296 10.882   
15 - 11 4.323 -3.266 11.912   
15 - 6 4.643 -2.945 12.232   
15 - 7 4.647 -2.941 12.236   
15 - 1 4.919 -2.669 12.508   
15 - 18 5.279 -2.310 12.867   
15 - 21 6.440 -1.148 14.029   
15 - 20 7.542 -0.046 15.131   
15 - 4 7.596 0.008 15.185 *** 
15 - 17 8.071 0.482 15.660 *** 
15 - 9 9.627 2.039 17.216 *** 
15 - 5 9.928 2.339 17.516 *** 
15 - 2 10.617 3.028 18.205 *** 
15 - 14 10.724 3.135 18.312 *** 
15 - 8 11.285 3.696 18.874 *** 
13 - 3 -31.136 -38.143 -24.130 *** 
13 - 10 -26.456 -33.514 -19.398 *** 
13 - 12 -7.314 -14.321 -0.307 *** 
13 - 15 -1.851 -9.440 5.738   
13 - 19 0.440 -6.618 7.498   
13 - 16 1.442 -5.565 8.448   
13 - 11 2.472 -4.535 9.479   
13 - 6 2.792 -4.214 9.799   
13 - 7 2.796 -4.210 9.803   
13 - 1 3.068 -3.938 10.075   
13 - 18 3.427 -3.579 10.434   
13 - 21 4.589 -2.417 11.596   
13 - 20 5.691 -1.315 12.698   
13 - 4 5.745 -1.261 12.752   
13 - 17 6.220 -0.787 13.227   
13 - 9 7.776 0.770 14.783 *** 
13 - 5 8.077 1.070 15.083 *** 
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Appendix L: (Continued) 
 
Comparisons significant at the 0.5 level are indicated by *** 
Person 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between Means 
Simultaneous 95% Confidence 
Limits  
13 - 2 8.766 1.759 15.772 *** 
13 - 14 8.873 1.866 15.879 *** 
13 - 8 9.434 2.427 16.440 *** 
19 - 3 -31.576 -38.634 -24.519 *** 
19 - 10 -26.896 -34.005 -19.788 *** 
19 - 12 -7.754 -14.812 -0.696 *** 
19 - 15 -2.292 -9.928 5.345   
19 - 13 -0.440 -7.498 6.618   
19 - 16 1.001 -6.057 8.059   
19 - 11 2.032 -5.026 9.090   
19 - 6 2.352 -4.706 9.410   
19 - 7 2.356 -4.702 9.414   
19 - 1 2.628 -4.430 9.686   
19 - 18 2.987 -4.071 10.045   
19 - 21 4.149 -2.909 11.207   
19 - 20 5.251 -1.807 12.309   
19 - 4 5.305 -1.753 12.363   
19 - 17 5.780 -1.278 12.838   
19 - 9 7.336 0.278 14.394 *** 
19 - 5 7.636 0.578 14.694 *** 
19 - 2 8.325 1.267 15.383 *** 
19 - 14 8.432 1.374 15.490 *** 
19 - 8 8.994 1.936 16.051 *** 
16 - 3 -32.578 -39.584 -25.571 *** 
16 - 10 -27.898 -34.956 -20.840 *** 
16 - 12 -8.756 -15.762 -1.749 *** 
16 - 15 -3.293 -10.882 4.296   
16 - 13 -1.442 -8.448 5.565   
16 - 19 -1.001 -8.059 6.057   
16 - 11 1.030 -5.976 8.037   
16 - 6 1.351 -5.656 8.357   
16 - 7 1.355 -5.652 8.361   
16 - 1 1.626 -5.380 8.633   
16 - 18 1.986 -5.021 8.992   
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Appendix L: (Continued) 
 
Comparisons significant at the 0.5 level are indicated by *** 
Person 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between Means 
Simultaneous 95% Confidence 
Limits  
     
16 - 21 3.148 -3.859 10.154   
16 - 20 4.250 -2.757 11.256   
16 - 4 4.303 -2.703 11.310   
16 - 17 4.778 -2.228 11.785   
16 - 9 6.335 -0.672 13.341   
16 - 5 6.635 -0.372 13.641   
16 - 2 7.324 0.317 14.330 *** 
16 - 14 7.431 0.424 14.437 *** 
16 - 8 7.992 0.986 14.999 *** 
11 - 3 -33.608 -40.615 -26.602 *** 
11 - 10 -28.928 -35.986 -21.870 *** 
11 - 12 -9.786 -16.793 -2.779 *** 
11 - 15 -4.323 -11.912 3.266   
11 - 13 -2.472 -9.479 4.535   
11 - 19 -2.032 -9.090 5.026   
11 - 16 -1.030 -8.037 5.976   
11 - 6 0.320 -6.686 7.327   
11 - 7 0.324 -6.682 7.331   
11 - 1 0.596 -6.410 7.603   
11 - 18 0.955 -6.051 7.962   
11 - 21 2.117 -4.889 9.124   
11 - 20 3.219 -3.787 10.226   
11 - 4 3.273 -3.733 10.280   
11 - 17 3.748 -3.259 10.755   
11 - 9 5.304 -1.702 12.311   
11 - 5 5.605 -1.402 12.611   
11 - 2 6.294 -0.713 13.300   
11 - 14 6.401 -0.606 13.407   
11 - 8 6.962 -0.045 13.968   
6 - 3 -33.928 -40.935 -26.922 *** 
6 - 10 -29.248 -36.306 -22.190 *** 
6 - 12 -10.106 -17.113 -3.100 *** 
6 - 15 -4.643 -12.232 2.945   
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Appendix L: (Continued) 
 
Comparisons significant at the 0.5 level are indicated by *** 
Person 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between Means 
Simultaneous 95% Confidence 
Limits  
6 - 13 -2.792 -9.799 4.214   
6 - 19 -2.352 -9.410 4.706   
6 - 16 -1.351 -8.357 5.656   
6 - 11 -0.320 -7.327 6.686   
6 - 7 0.004 -7.003 7.011   
6 - 1 0.276 -6.731 7.283   
6 - 18 0.635 -6.371 7.642   
6 - 21 1.797 -5.210 8.804   
6 - 20 2.899 -4.108 9.906   
6 - 4 2.953 -4.054 9.959   
6 - 17 3.428 -3.579 10.434   
6 - 9 4.984 -2.023 11.991   
6 - 5 5.284 -1.722 12.291   
6 - 2 5.973 -1.033 12.980   
6 - 14 6.080 -0.926 13.087   
6 - 8 6.642 -0.365 13.648   
7 - 3 -33.932 -40.939 -26.926 *** 
7 - 10 -29.252 -36.310 -22.194 *** 
7 - 12 -10.110 -17.117 -3.104 *** 
7 - 15 -4.647 -12.236 2.941   
7 - 13 -2.796 -9.803 4.210   
7 - 19 -2.356 -9.414 4.702   
7 - 16 -1.355 -8.361 5.652   
7 - 11 -0.324 -7.331 6.682   
7 - 6 -0.004 -7.011 7.003   
7 - 1 0.272 -6.735 7.278   
7 - 18 0.631 -6.375 7.638   
7 - 21 1.793 -5.214 8.800   
7 - 20 2.895 -4.112 9.902   
7 - 4 2.949 -4.058 9.955   
7 - 17 3.424 -3.583 10.430   
7 - 9 4.980 -2.027 11.987   
7 - 5 5.280 -1.726 12.287   
7 - 2 5.969 -1.037 12.976   
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Appendix L: (Continued) 
 
Comparisons significant at the 0.5 level are indicated by *** 
Person 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between Means 
Simultaneous 95% Confidence 
Limits  
7 - 14 6.076 -0.930 13.083   
7 - 8 6.638 -0.369 13.644   
1 - 3 -34.204 -41.211 -27.198 *** 
1 - 10 -29.524 -36.582 -22.466 *** 
1 - 12 -10.382 -17.389 -3.376 *** 
1 - 15 -4.919 -12.508 2.669   
1 - 13 -3.068 -10.075 3.938   
1 - 19 -2.628 -9.686 4.430   
1 - 16 -1.626 -8.633 5.380   
1 - 11 -0.596 -7.603 6.410   
1 - 6 -0.276 -7.283 6.731   
1 - 7 -0.272 -7.278 6.735   
1 - 18 0.359 -6.647 7.366   
1 - 21 1.521 -5.486 8.528   
1 - 20 2.623 -4.383 9.630   
1 - 4 2.677 -4.330 9.684   
1 - 17 3.152 -3.855 10.158   
1 - 9 4.708 -2.298 11.715   
1 - 5 5.008 -1.998 12.015   
1 - 2 5.697 -1.309 12.704   
1 - 14 5.804 -1.202 12.811   
1 – 8 6.366 -0.641 13.372   
18 – 3 -34.564 -41.570 -27.557 *** 
18 – 10 -29.883 -36.941 -22.826 *** 
18 – 12 -10.741 -17.748 -3.735 *** 
18 – 15 -5.279 -12.867 2.310   
18 – 13 -3.427 -10.434 3.579   
18 – 19 -2.987 -10.045 4.071   
18 – 16 -1.986 -8.992 5.021   
18 – 11 -0.955 -7.962 6.051   
18 – 6 -0.635 -7.642 6.371   
18 – 7 -0.631 -7.638 6.375   
18 – 1 -0.359 -7.366 6.647   
18 – 21 1.162 -5.845 8.168   
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Appendix L: (Continued) 
 
Comparisons significant at the 0.5 level are indicated by *** 
Person 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between Means 
Simultaneous 95% Confidence 
Limits  
18 - 20 2.264 -4.743 9.271   
18 - 4 2.318 -4.689 9.324   
18 - 17 2.793 -4.214 9.799   
18 - 9 4.349 -2.658 11.355   
18 - 5 4.649 -2.357 11.656   
18 - 2 5.338 -1.668 12.345   
18 - 14 5.445 -1.561 12.452   
18 - 8 6.007 -1.000 13.013   
21 - 3 -35.725 -42.732 -28.719 *** 
21 - 10 -31.045 -38.103 -23.987 *** 
21 - 12 -11.903 -18.910 -4.897 *** 
21 - 15 -6.440 -14.029 1.148   
21 - 13 -4.589 -11.596 2.417   
21 - 19 -4.149 -11.207 2.909   
21 - 16 -3.148 -10.154 3.859   
21 - 11 -2.117 -9.124 4.889   
21 - 6 -1.797 -8.804 5.210   
21 - 7 -1.793 -8.800 5.214   
21 - 1 -1.521 -8.528 5.486   
21 - 18 -1.162 -8.168 5.845   
21 - 20 1.102 -5.904 8.109   
21 - 4 1.156 -5.851 8.163   
21 - 17 1.631 -5.376 8.637   
21 - 9 3.187 -3.820 10.194   
21 - 5 3.487 -3.519 10.494   
21 - 2 4.176 -2.830 11.183   
21 - 14 4.283 -2.723 11.290   
21 - 8 4.845 -2.162 11.851   
20 - 3 -36.827 -43.834 -29.821 *** 
20 - 10 -32.147 -39.205 -25.089 *** 
20 - 12 -13.005 -20.012 -5.999 *** 
20 - 15 -7.542 -15.131 0.046   
20 - 13 -5.691 -12.698 1.315   
20 - 19 -5.251 -12.309 1.807   
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Appendix L: (Continued) 
 
Comparisons significant at the 0.5 level are indicated by *** 
Person 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between Means 
Simultaneous 95% Confidence 
Limits  
20 - 16 -4.250 -11.256 2.757   
20 - 11 -3.219 -10.226 3.787   
20 - 6 -2.899 -9.906 4.108   
20 - 7 -2.895 -9.902 4.112   
20 - 1 -2.623 -9.630 4.383   
20 - 18 -2.264 -9.271 4.743   
20 - 21 -1.102 -8.109 5.904   
20 - 4 0.054 -6.953 7.060   
20 - 17 0.529 -6.478 7.535   
20 - 9 2.085 -4.922 9.092   
20 - 5 2.385 -4.621 9.392   
20 - 2 3.074 -3.932 10.081   
20 - 14 3.181 -3.825 10.188   
20 - 8 3.743 -3.264 10.749   
4 - 3 -36.881 -43.888 -29.875 *** 
4 - 10 -32.201 -39.259 -25.143 *** 
4 - 12 -13.059 -20.066 -6.053 *** 
4 - 15 -7.596 -15.185 -0.008 *** 
4 - 13 -5.745 -12.752 1.261   
4 - 19 -5.305 -12.363 1.753   
4 - 16 -4.303 -11.310 2.703   
4 - 11 -3.273 -10.280 3.733   
4 - 6 -2.953 -9.959 4.054   
4 - 7 -2.949 -9.955 4.058   
4 - 1 -2.677 -9.684 4.330   
4 - 18 -2.318 -9.324 4.689   
4 - 21 -1.156 -8.163 5.851   
4 - 20 -0.054 -7.060 6.953   
4 - 17 0.475 -6.532 7.481   
4 - 9 2.031 -4.975 9.038   
4 - 5 2.331 -4.675 9.338   
4 - 2 3.020 -3.986 10.027   
4 - 14 3.127 -3.879 10.134   
4 - 8 3.689 -3.318 10.695   
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Appendix L: (Continued) 
 
Comparisons significant at the 0.5 level are indicated by *** 
Person 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between Means 
Simultaneous 95% Confidence 
Limits  
17 - 3 -37.356 -44.363 -30.350 *** 
17 - 10 -32.676 -39.734 -25.618 *** 
17 - 12 -13.534 -20.541 -6.527 *** 
17 - 15 -8.071 -15.660 -0.482 *** 
17 - 13 -6.220 -13.227 0.787   
17 - 19 -5.780 -12.838 1.278   
17 - 16 -4.778 -11.785 2.228   
17 - 11 -3.748 -10.755 3.259   
17 - 6 -3.428 -10.434 3.579   
17 - 7 -3.424 -10.430 3.583   
17 - 1 -3.152 -10.158 3.855   
17 - 18 -2.793 -9.799 4.214   
17 - 21 -1.631 -8.637 5.376   
17 - 20 -0.529 -7.535 6.478   
17 - 4 -0.475 -7.481 6.532   
17 - 9 1.556 -5.450 8.563   
17 - 5 1.857 -5.150 8.863   
17 - 2 2.546 -4.461 9.552   
17 - 14 2.653 -4.354 9.659   
17 - 8 3.214 -3.793 10.220   
9 - 3 -38.912 -45.919 -31.906 *** 
9 - 10 -34.232 -41.290 -27.174 *** 
9 - 12 -15.090 -22.097 -8.084 *** 
9 - 15 -9.627 -17.216 -2.039 *** 
9 - 13 -7.776 -14.783 -0.770 *** 
9 - 19 -7.336 -14.394 -0.278 *** 
9 - 16 -6.335 -13.341 0.672   
9 - 11 -5.304 -12.311 1.702   
9 - 6 -4.984 -11.991 2.023   
9 - 7 -4.980 -11.987 2.027   
9 - 1 -4.708 -11.715 2.298   
9 - 18 -4.349 -11.355 2.658   
9 - 21 -3.187 -10.194 3.820   
9 - 20 -2.085 -9.092 4.922   
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Appendix L: (Continued) 
 
Comparisons significant at the 0.5 level are indicated by *** 
Person 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between Means 
Simultaneous 95% Confidence 
Limits  
9 - 4 -2.031 -9.038 4.975   
9 - 17 -1.556 -8.563 5.450   
9 - 5 0.300 -6.706 7.307   
9 - 2 0.989 -6.017 7.996   
9 - 14 1.096 -5.910 8.103   
9 - 8 1.658 -5.349 8.664   
5 - 3 -39.213 -46.219 -32.206 *** 
5 - 10 -34.533 -41.591 -27.475 *** 
5 - 12 -15.391 -22.397 -8.384 *** 
5 - 15 -9.928 -17.516 -2.339 *** 
5 - 13 -8.077 -15.083 -1.070 *** 
5 - 19 -7.636 -14.694 -0.578 *** 
5 - 16 -6.635 -13.641 0.372   
5 – 11 -5.605 -12.611 1.402   
5 – 6 -5.284 -12.291 1.722   
5 – 7 -5.280 -12.287 1.726   
5 – 1 -5.008 -12.015 1.998   
5 – 18 -4.649 -11.656 2.357   
5 – 21 -3.487 -10.494 3.519   
5 – 20 -2.385 -9.392 4.621   
5 – 4 -2.331 -9.338 4.675   
5 – 17 -1.857 -8.863 5.150   
5 – 9 -0.300 -7.307 6.706   
5 – 2 0.689 -6.318 7.696   
5 – 14 0.796 -6.211 7.803   
5 – 8 1.357 -5.649 8.364   
2 – 3 -39.902 -46.908 -32.895 *** 
2 – 10 -35.222 -42.280 -28.164 *** 
2 – 12 -16.080 -23.086 -9.073 *** 
2 – 15 -10.617 -18.205 -3.028 *** 
2 – 13 -8.766 -15.772 -1.759 *** 
2 – 19 -8.325 -15.383 -1.267 *** 
2 – 16 -7.324 -14.330 -0.317 *** 
2 – 11 -6.294 -13.300 0.713   
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Appendix L: (Continued) 
 
Comparisons significant at the 0.5 level are indicated by *** 
Person 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between Means 
Simultaneous 95% Confidence 
Limits  
2 – 6 -5.973 -12.980 1.033   
2 – 7 -5.969 -12.976 1.037   
2 – 1 -5.697 -12.704 1.309   
2 – 18 -5.338 -12.345 1.668   
2 – 21 -4.176 -11.183 2.830   
2 – 20 -3.074 -10.081 3.932   
2 – 4 -3.020 -10.027 3.986   
2 – 17 -2.546 -9.552 4.461   
2 – 9 -0.989 -7.996 6.017   
2 – 5 -0.689 -7.696 6.318   
2 – 14 0.107 -6.900 7.114   
2 – 8 0.668 -6.338 7.675   
14 – 3 -40.009 -47.015 -33.002 *** 
14 – 10 -35.329 -42.387 -28.271 *** 
14 – 12 -16.187 -23.193 -9.180 *** 
14 – 15 -10.724 -18.312 -3.135 *** 
14 – 13 -8.873 -15.879 -1.866 *** 
14 – 19 -8.432 -15.490 -1.374 *** 
14 – 16 -7.431 -14.437 -0.424 *** 
14 – 11 -6.401 -13.407 0.606   
14 - 6 -6.080 -13.087 0.926   
14 - 7 -6.076 -13.083 0.930   
14 - 1 -5.804 -12.811 1.202   
14 - 18 -5.445 -12.452 1.561   
14 - 21 -4.283 -11.290 2.723   
14 - 20 -3.181 -10.188 3.825   
14 - 4 -3.127 -10.134 3.879   
14 - 17 -2.653 -9.659 4.354   
14 - 9 -1.096 -8.103 5.910   
14 - 5 -0.796 -7.803 6.211   
14 - 2 -0.107 -7.114 6.900   
14 - 8 0.561 -6.445 7.568   
8 - 3 -40.570 -47.577 -33.563 *** 
8 - 10 -35.890 -42.948 -28.832 *** 
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Appendix L: (Continued) 
 
Comparisons significant at the 0.5 level are indicated by *** 
Person 
Comparison 
Difference 
Between Means 
Simultaneous 95% 
Confidence 
Limits 
8 - 12 -16.748 -23.754 -9.741 ***
8 - 15 -11.285 -18.874 -3.696 ***
8 - 13 -9.434 -16.440 -2.427 ***
8 - 19 -8.994 -16.051 -1.936 ***
8 - 16 -7.992 -14.999 -0.986 ***
8 - 11 -6.962 -13.968 0.045  
8 - 6 -6.642 -13.648 0.365  
8 - 7 -6.638 -13.644 0.369  
8 - 1 -6.366 -13.372 0.641  
8 - 18 -6.007 -13.013 1.000  
8 - 21 -4.845 -11.851 2.162  
8 - 20 -3.743 -10.749 3.264  
8 - 4 -3.689 -10.695 3.318  
8 - 17 -3.214 -10.220 3.793  
8 - 9 -1.658 -8.664 5.349  
8 - 5 -1.357 -8.364 5.649  
8 - 2 -0.668 -7.675 6.338  
8 - 14 -0.561 -7.568 6.445  
 
 
